Jour Fixe of the ZeS

Lectures in the winter semester of 2013/14.

13.11.2013Lecture

Capitalist diversity on Europe's periphery

Prof. Dr. Dorothee Bohle (Central European University (CEU))
Place:
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Unicom-Building
Room: 3380
Mary-Somerville-Straße 3
28359 Bremen
Time:
16:15 - 17:45
Lecture Series:
Jour Fixe
Semester:
WiSe 2013/14

The presentation analyzes the key features and origins of three variants of capitalism that have emerged in East-Central Europe: a neoliberal type in the Baltic states (and Bulgaria and Romania), an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrad countries, and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia. Based on a Polanyian framework, the first part of the talk explores the differences of these capitalist varieties in terms of marketization, industrial transformation, social protection, industrial protection and macroeconomic stability. The second part explains how these varieties have come about. First, it is argued that the legacies of the past, and their perceptions as either threats or assets to these countries’ future, have had a deep impact on regime types. Second, the importance of transnational influences in shaping regime formation will be shown.

27.11.2013Lecture

Belastete Richter – belastete Rechtsprechung? Die Sozialgerichtsbarkeit und die NS-Vergangenheit am Beispiel NRW

Dr. Marc von Miquel (sv:dok - Dokumentations- und Forschungsstelle der Sozialversicherungsträger)
Place:
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Unicom-Building
Room: 3380
Mary-Somerville-Straße 3
28359 Bremen
Time:
16:15 - 17:45
Lecture Series:
Jour Fixe
Semester:
WiSe 2013/14

11.12.2013Lecture

Welfare chauvinism and party behaviour

Dr. Gijs Schumacher (University of Southern Denmark)
Place:
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Unicom-Building
Room: 3380
Mary-Somerville-Straße 3
28359 Bremen
Time:
16:15 - 17:45
Lecture Series:
Jour Fixe
Semester:
WiSe 2013/14

Populist parties increasingly emphasize welfare chauvinism. They criticize mainstream parties for cutting and slashing welfare at the expense of the 'native' population and to the benefit of the 'undeserving' immigrant. Given recent electoral success of these populist parties we investigate whether and when mainstream parties ignore or adapt - attack or accommodate - welfare chauvinism.
We evaluate various theories of party behavior and issue evolution, which suggest that mainstream parties adapt if they are losing influence, that the timing of adaptation varies and that ideology matters in how parties adapt. Our analyses of party manifestos, speeches and policies of European mainstream and populist parties (1980-2012) suggest that mainstream parties adapt to populist parties on welfare chauvinism, but there is large variation in who adapts and when one adapts. In our examinations of the Dutch and Danish cases we further highlight important cross-country and cross-party differences.

Place:
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Unicom-Building
Room: 3380
Mary-Somerville-Straße 3
28359 Bremen
Time:
16:15 - 17:45
Lecture Series:
Jour Fixe
Semester:
WiSe 2013/14

Place:
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, Unicom-Building
Room: 3380
Mary-Somerville-Straß 3
28359 Bremen
Time:
16:15 - 17:45
Lecture Series:
Jour Fixe
Semester:
WiSe 2013/14

The European Commission is at the centre of the EU political system. Within its five-year terms each Commission proposes up to 2000 binding legal acts and thus crucially shapes form and substance of EU policy that impacts on the daily lives of more than 500 Mio European citizens. However, despite the EU Commission’s outstanding role in setting the agenda for European decision making, little is known about its internal dynamics when preparing legislation. We do not know why the EU Commission at times proposes legislative drafts that disembogue into a situation characterised by opposition from Member States, that introduce strikingly high or low standards, or that contradict each other. How can we understand at times puzzling proposals? What drives the Commission when proposing such legislation?

To answer these questions position formation of 48 legislative proposals in the areas of research and innovation, consumer policy and the intersection of social and common market policies (1999-2009) is traced and systematically compared. The project reveals that various internal positions prevail and that power and conflict inside the European Commission are essential to understand the substantial policies that are proposed for Europe. Opening the black box Commission, we identify three ideal types of internal position formation. The Commission is depicted as motivated by technocratic problem solving, by competence seeking utility maximization or ideologically motivated policy-seeking. Specifying conditions that favour one logic over the others, the typology furthers our understanding of how the EU system functions and provides novel explanations for EU policies with substantial societal implications.