

Political Oversight of the Ministerial Bureaucracy from the Perspective of Principal-Agent-Theory. Institutional Design, formal Models and laboratory-experimental Examination.

Overview

The goal of the research project is to analyze the effect that different institutional configurations of the delegation between politics and ministerial administration have, based on the Principle-Agent theory and to empirically validate a formal solution through laboratory experiments.

Duration:

01 January 2013 - 01 January 2017

Research Team:

Prof. Dr. Susumu Shikano (Head of project)

[Prof. Dr. Markus Tepe](#) (Head of project)

Funding:

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)

Details

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Project Type:

Cooperation Project

