University of Bremen

Collaborative Research Center 597 ("Transformations of the State")

Project B1: Legitimating States, International Regimes, and Economic Orders

Codebook – Final Version

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I   Overview

The B1 project of the 2003-2014 Collaborative Research Centre "Transformations of the State" (the DFG-funded *Sonderforschungsbereich* 597) at the University of Bremen, Germany, examined public (media) discourses on the legitimacy of four *democratic nation states* (phase 1, 2003-2006), three *international regimes* (phase 2, 2007-2010), and the economic regime of *capitalist market economy* (phase 3, 2011-2014).

This codebook documents the research design of the quantitative, content-analytical parts of the project. It first explains how the text corpora and data sets used in the three project phases were put together (II). It then presents the coding scheme used in our content analysis and related coding rules (III).

Four separate pairs of text corpora and related data sets were created. The data sets in SPSS format are available upon request from the project team; note that the text corpora on which they are based are not publicly available due to copyright restrictions.

The following two sections provide general information relating to all four pairs of corpora and data sets and, where applicable, information and coding rules that pertain to only one or some of the corpora and data sets. We refer the readers of this codebook to the research design and methods sections of our project publications for additional information and justifications of our methodological choices, sampling decisions, and coding rules: Nullmeier et al. 2010 (Chapter 3), 2014 (Chapter 2); Schneider et al. 2010 (Chapter 2).

II   Text corpora and data sets

The project identified, coded and analyzed legitimation discourses

- in the media of *four* countries: Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US);
- in *two* quality newspapers per country: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ), *Tagesanzeiger* (TA, both CH); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ, both DE); *Guardian* (GRD), *Times* (TMS, both UK); *New York Times* (NYT), *Washington Post* (WP, both US);
- in a 1998-2013 observation period (1998-2011 for the economic regime).

The text corpora and data sets capture communication in Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the legitimacy of

- the four *national* political systems ('national time series');
- three international regimes: the European Union (EU), the G7/8, and the United Nations (UN; 'international time series');
- the capitalist market economy ('economic time series').

While sampling strategies (described in greater detail below) were used for the three time series, there is an additional text corpus and data set on legitimation discourses related to the four *national* political systems in 2004; this "monitoring" corpus and data set cover the entire year 2004. All the corpora draw on the electronic versions of relevant articles in .rtf format from the eight newspapers, as provided by the databases Factiva and F.A.Z.-BiblioNet (the

newspaper-owned database of the FAZ, the only newspaper that cancelled its cooperation with Factiva during our data collection); the datasets are in SPSS format.

As it proved impossible for a fully automated procedure to do justice to the highly varied and often complex linguistic form that legitimation discourses may take, relevant articles for each of the corpora were identified in a *two-step procedure* combining automated searches – with slightly different search routines (also described in detail below) for the national, international and economic corpora – and a manual step. The output of the automated searches was read by the members of the research team to identify legitimacy-related articles; more precisely, articles were included in the corpora if they contained at least one so-called *legitimation statement* – the basic unit of our content analysis.

Extensive pretests were used in the construction of the search routines to ensure that as many relevant articles as possible containing this type of propositions would be retrieved from the data base (thus minimizing false negatives) while keeping the number of irrelevant articles in the search output as small as possible (thus minimizing false positives).

After text retrieval, the articles were apportioned to human coders (members of the research team). This process was randomized in order to minimize potential coder biases. In practical terms, we emulated a stratified random sampling technique, as articles were drawn and distributed randomly across human coders for every political or economic regime and year; as a result, all coders were responsible for an even but randomly distributed share of articles.

Obviously irrelevant articles were weeded out by the individual coders. In all three project phases, we used reliability tests (with a sample size of ten per cent of the actual text sample) to establish that this selection process could be performed with adequate inter-coder reliability. Reliability test were conducted for all three phases of the project. Results for pairwise agreement were always are well above 90 per cent and ranged around 0.7 for the more conservative Krippendorff's alpha. The individual selection of articles was, however, complemented by discussions in the team about doubtful cases. As indicated above, the ultimate decision on the inclusion of articles turned around the identification of at least one legitimation statement. We also tested the reliability of statement identification and found that it was reliable across coders with a per cent agreement of 90 per cent and more or Krippendorff's alpha of 0.7 and more. However, the decision on the inclusion of doubtful statements was also made on the basis of group decisions.

A proposition qualifies as a *legitimation statement* if it may be "translated" into the standard-form evaluative proposition described by a legitimation "grammar": LO is (il)legitimate because LC. Hence, a legitimation statement is defined as a statement that legitimates or delegitimates a legitimation object (i.e., evaluates it positively or negatively) on the basis of a legitimation criterion (a normative benchmark).

Note, first, that the *search words* of the automated step (which appear in bold print in the Factiva output) merely served as *indicators* for the likely presence of a legitimation statements. However, these statements may also be formulated in terms not contained in the search routines. For the national monitoring text corpus, only paragraphs containing search words were considered, but even here, the actual legitimation statements did not have to contain the search words. For the time series, entire articles were read; here, too, the search words in bold served as mere indicators for the likely presence of a legitimation statement.

Note, secondly, that the statements might be spread over more than one sentence (in the syntactical sense of the word), and the LO, LC and positive or negative evaluation may be conveyed by different types of words or parts of a sentence. Two or more elements of the "grammar" might also be conflated, as in a proposition of the type "the political system is not democratic" (implication: "is illegitimate because…"). Even a single word, such as a reference to the British House of Commons as a "talkshop" or to the EU Commission as the "Brussels mafia", might qualify as a legitimation statement. The decisive criterion for inclusion was always the clearly evaluative character of a proposition – and hence that it could plausibly be "translated" by readers into the extensive form of our "grammar" (Table 1).

Thirdly, a number of supplementary rules were used to discard irrelevant statements:

- The readers were told not to "read between the lines" in imputing evaluative content; where the positive or negative direction of an assessment could not be established "beyond reasonable doubt", the proposition had to be excluded: "What has taken place in Iowa is as transparent as anything in American politics". This may notably be the case where statements are (potentially) ironic or are formulated as rhetorical questions: "Aren't the problems of the UN obvious"?
- Likewise, statements were excluded if the assessment – usually a negative one – was merely implied in a demand, or the comparative form of an adjective, such as: "The decision-making processes of the EU must become more transparent". The only exception here are cases that demand the return to a presumably legitimate status quo ante, which implies that the status quo is criticized or delegimated; these cases are often characterized by the use of verbs with the prefix "re-" in English and similar formulations in German: "A satisfactory degree of leadership has to be re-established in order to make our political system functional".
- The legitimation object, its connection to a legitimation criterion, or the positive or negative character of the assessment is not clearly identifiable for some other reason (but the context of a sentence, paragraph, or article could always be used to disambiguate the meaning of a proposition).

We drew on David Easton's (1965, 1975) distinction between political community, regime, and authorities to confine our searches and coding to propositions that evaluate legitimation objects at the political community or regime level. Thus, assessments of authorities (the incumbents of political offices such as Chancellor Merkel or collective actors such as her party, the Christian Democratic Union, as opposed to key institutions or groups of actors like "the executive" or "the party system") as well as evaluations of policies ("the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay is a monstrous failure of justice") were not included. However, we did include assessments of specific regime principles, core institutions, and major groups of actors associated with (inter)national political or economic regimes (see coding scheme in III).

Moreover, only evaluations of current regimes at the time of writing and publication were considered; this rule excludes

- assessments of historical (predecessor) regimes (such as the Nazi regime in the German case) or even evaluations of, say, the *Bundestag* in the 1950s; exception: the historical reference – which is not coded as a legitimation statement itself – is used, comparatively, to legitimate or delegitimate a current legitimation object: "In the antebellum period, the political class of this nation respected the intentions of our Founding Fathers; today, our traditions are constantly disrespected".

- prospective or hypothetical statements: "Britain is poised to become one of the most successful 21st century economies"; "if we don't do anything about the welfare state, its effects may become more and more unfair".

On the other hand, we included evaluations if they referred to legitimation objects as abstract principles, instead of the four specific national (CH, DE, UK, US) or international (EU, G7/8, UN) manifestations considered in our research. Hence, statements like "Arundhati Roy criticises the corruption of democracy" were included but not statements like "Arundhati Roy criticizes the corruption of Indian democracy".

Also, we largely followed the manifest content of texts (rather than applying some kind of expert judgement) in identifying and coding legitimation objects. Hence, a statement such as "British presidentialism is illegitimate" (which may have been made in the context of debates about the "presidentialization" of British parliamentary democracy) would have been included in our sample and coded as such.

Finally, our identification and coding of explicit normative benchmarks – legitimation criteria – indicates that our notion of legitimacy is close to Easton's concept of diffuse (as opposed to specific) support. However, clearly evaluative propositions of an unspecific kind (i.e., the normative benchmark is not made explicit, as in "the political system of Germany is legitimate") were also included. On the other hand, we treated reports on the results of polls, etc., as factual statements (rather than assessments put forward by x per cent of the respondents): "A poll of students found that 45 per cent trusted government…".

Table 1: Legitimation grammar and examples

Example 1:

The Liberal Democrat leader [Paddy Ashdown] told a rally in Eastbourne that the system was now so […] inefficient and secretive that it no longer served the citizen. He said: »Next Tuesday you could elect […] 650 saints; but it wouldn't make any difference if our system no longer works« (*Times*, 3.4.1992).

| Britain's political system… | is illegitimate | because it is… | (1) | inefficient and |
| | | | (2) | not transparent. |

Example 2:

The people and their representatives have been sent to the sidelines by the courts, and that's not right (*Washington Post*, 6 February 2004).

| The US judiciary… | is illegitimate… | because… | it undermines popular sovereignty. |

We now turn to the individual search routines and, where applicable, the sampling procedures used for the national monitoring, (inter)national and economic time series.

National monitoring: As indicated above, this corpus and data set cover the entire year 2004 (with the exception of Sunday editions and holidays). The search routines for each country (CH, DE, UK, US) were constructed on the basis of two dictionaries – a list of words and terms capturing legitimation objects and a second list of words and terms that are typically used in references to legitimation criteria. All search routines have the following structure:

$$(LO_1 \text{ OR } LO_2 \text{ OR } \ldots LO_n) \text{ SAME } (PL_1 \text{ OR } PL_2 \text{ OR } \ldots PL_n)$$

Neither the LO nor the LC word lists in German and English are exhaustive. In fact, the dictionaries of LO used for the preselection step are considerably more restricted than the category system on the basis of which LO are coded (see below): They contain only terms that refer to the political community and regime as a whole, to core functions of the democratic nation state or TRUDI state (Leibfried et al. 2015), and to a few other core political institutions and actors, procedures and principles. The reason for this is practical: We avoided an output with large amounts of irrelevant articles referring to the daily routines of political institutions and actors by not including terms like "Bundeskanzler", "House of Commons", etc., in the automated search routines. There are even good theoretical reasons to expect most legitimation statements and the articles they are contained in to be characterized precisely by the fact that they are pitched at the regime level, and this is indeed the case (i.e., a plurality of statements ultimately identified assess the political community or regime as a whole or at a fairly general level, and relevant articles usually contain at least one statement of this general kind). Of course, this may not always be the case; the procedure is thus likely to produce some false negative results where articles evaluate only specific institutions not covered by the search routines, although pretests suggest that their number is negligible.

The LC dictionaries are even less exhaustive. Some legitimation criteria are easily captured by specific words and terms – for instance, the normative benchmark of "efficiency" by "(in)efficient", "justice" by "(in)justice" or "(un)fair", etc. Other criteria are less clearly linked with particular words. Many of the terms we included in the dictionaries – and many of those we omitted for precisely that reason – are ambiguous or frequently used in other contexts. Hence, the LC dictionaries are even less "closed" theoretically than the lists of LO. Again, however, pretests suggest that the number of false negative results is negligible if the two lists are combined in the way suggested here.

Finally, our pretests confirmed that the operator SAME (occurrence of two search terms in the same paragraph) yielded fewer irrelevant articles than the operator AND while not producing many false negatives. Overall, then, our preselection procedure achieves the objective of minimizing false negative results, but yields a considerable number of false positive ones. These are sorted out in the next steps of the procedure.

Given length restrictions in Factiva (2048 letters per search request), a series of search requests had to be used for each country. Therefore, articles were sometimes found twice, but on the basis of different combinations of search words. Such duplicates were eliminated from the corpora. In cases were the search engine turned up different versions of the same article, we selected the longest version.

Also note that in the monitoring corpus, up to ten legitimation statements per article were identified and coded; statements resulting in exactly the same coding were included only once per article in the data set. Both of these restrictions were dropped in the coding of the (inter)national and economic time series.

The following routines were used; they are as parallel as possible for the two languages (German and English) and the four countries, but take peculiarities of the languages as well as national idiosyncracies in terms of institutional arrangements, etc., into account (for instance, while "Staat" is included as an LO in German, the polysemy of "state" or even "the state" makes these search terms useless in English; "monarchy" is a relevant term in the United Kingdom but not elsewhere).

CH

Search routine 1: (Schweiz* or Bund or Volk or Volkes or Volks or Republik or Politik or (polit* adj1 (System* or Ordnung or Klasse or Elite)) or Regierungssystem* or Regierungsform* or Staat or Staates or Staats or Staatsform* or Demokratie or Nationalstaat* or Nation or Rechtsstaat* or Rechtsordnung or Rechtssystem* or Verfassung or Grundgesetz* or Sozialstaat* or Wohlfahrtsstaat* or Souverän* or (national* adj1 Unabhängigkeit) or Gewaltmonopol or Parlamentarismus or Konkordanz* or Konsensdemokratie or Parteiendemokratie or Referendumsdemokratie or Parteienstaat* or Parteiensystem* or Verbändesystem* or Föderal* or Eidgenossenschaft or Wahlsystem* or Milizsystem* or Neutralität*) same (volkssouverän* or Volkswille or Volksherrschaft or Repräsentati* or demokratisch* or undemokrat* or diktat* or tyrann* or Partizipation or Beteiligung or Machtkonz* or argumenta* or deliberat* or diskurs* or transparent* or intransparent* or durchschau* or undurchschau* or durchsichtig* or undurchsichtig* or geheim* or Rechenschaft or Verantwort* or Unverantwort* or Rechtfertig* or Vertrauen* or Machtmissbrauch or Gemeinwohl or Legal* or Illegal* or rechtmäßig* or unrechtmäßig* or gesetzmäßig* or gesetzeswidrig* or Rechtssicherheit* or verfassungskonform* or verfassungswidrig* or verfassungsgemäß* or korrupt* or charisma* or führungs* or expert* or Laie* or professionell* or unprofessionell* or kompet* or inkompet* or Dilettant* or amateurhaft* or göttlich* or Gott or Heilig* or Christlich* or (auserwählt* adj1 (Volk or Volk$1 or Volk$2)) or Bibel or biblisch* or tradition* or konvention* or unkonventione* or Brauch or bewährt)

Search routine 2: (Schweiz* or Bund or Volk or Volkes or Volks or Republik or Politik or (polit* adj1 (System* or Ordnung or Klasse or Elite)) or Regierungssystem* or Regierungsform* or Staat or Staates or Staats or Staatsform* or Demokratie or Nationalstaat* or Nation or Rechtsstaat* or Rechtsordnung or Rechtssystem* or Verfassung or Grundgesetz* or Sozialstaat* or Wohlfahrtsstaat* or Souverän* or (national* adj1 Unabhängigkeit) or Gewaltmonopol or Parlamentarismus or Konkordanz* or Konsensdemokratie or Parteiendemokratie or Referendumsdemokratie or Parteienstaat* or Parteiensystem* or Verbändesystem* or Föderal* or Eidgenossenschaft or Wahlsystem* or Milizsystem* or Neutralität*) same (Menschenrecht* or Grundrecht* or Freiheit or Völkerrecht* or reversib* or irreversib* or nachhaltig* or umkehrbar* or unumkehrbar or befähig* or aktivier* or (gleich* adj1 Chancen) or Chancengleichheit or effektiv* or ineffektiv* or Erfolg* or Scheiter* or Versag* or Reform* or Stillstand* or Blockade* or Blockier* or ineffizien* or effizien* or kosten-nutzen or gerecht* or ungerecht* or (gleich* adj1 (Recht or Recht$1)) or Gleichheit or ungleich* or fair* or unfair* or solidari* or unsolidari* or unsozial* or stabil* or instabil* or Krise* or Integrati* or Desintegrati* or Verlässlich* or berechenbar* or unberechenbar* or Extrem* or Rechtsextrem* or Linksextrem* or Terroristisch* or Ruin or Zusammenbruch or identi* or Selbstverständnis* or (geteilt* adj1 Wert*) or (gemeinsam* adj1 Wert*) or legitim* or illegitim* or akzept* or inakzept* or Moral* or Unmoral* or Recht or Unrecht or glaubwürdig* or unglaubwürdig* or Scham or Schäm* or Stolz or Begeister* or Politikverdrossenheit or Parteienverdrossenheit)

DE

Search routine 1: (Deutschland* or Bundesrepublik or Volk or Volkes or Volks or Republik or Politik or (polit* adj1 (System* or Ordnung or Klasse or Elite)) or Regierungssystem* or Regierungsform* or Staat or Staates or Staats or Staatsform* or Demokratie or Nationalstaat* or Nation or Rechtsstaat* or Rechtsordnung or Rechtssystem* or Verfassung or Grundgesetz* or Sozialstaat* or Wohlfahrtsstaat* or Souverän* or (national* adj1 Unabhängigkeit) or Gewaltmonopol or Parlamentarismus or Konkurrenzdemokratie or Konsensdemokratie or Parteiendemokratie or Parteienstaat* or Parteiensystem* or Verbändesystem* or Föderal* or Bundesstaat* or Wahlsystem*) same (volkssouverän* or Volkswille or Volksherrschaft or Repräsentati* or demokratisch* or undemokrat* or diktat* or tyrann* or Partizipation or Beteiligung or Machtkonz* or argumenta* or deliberat* or diskurs* or transparent* or intransparent* or durchschau* or undurchschau* or durchsichtig* or undurchsichtig* or geheim* or Rechenschaft or Verantwort* or Unverantwort* or Rechtfertig* or Vertrauen* or Machtmissbrauch or Gemeinwohl or Legal* or Illegal* or rechtmäßig* or unrechtmäßig* or gesetzmäßig* or gesetzeswidrig* or Rechtssicherheit* or verfassungskonform* or verfassungswidrig* or verfassungsgemäß* or korrupt* or charisma* or führungs* or expert* or Laie* or professionell* or unprofessionell* or kompet* or inkompet* or Dilettant* or amateurhaft* or göttlich* or Gott or Heilig* or Christlich* or (auserwählt* adj1 (Volk or Volk$1 or Volk$2)) or Bibel or biblisch* or tradition* or konvention* or unkonventione* or Brauch or bewährt)

Search routine 2: (Deutschland* or Bundesrepublik or Volk or Volkes or Volks or Republik or Politik or (polit* adj1 (System* or Ordnung or Klasse or Elite)) or Regierungssystem* or Regierungsform* or Staat or Staates or Staats or Staatsform* or Demokratie or Nationalstaat* or Nation or Rechtsstaat* or Rechtsordnung or Rechtssystem* or Verfassung or Grundgesetz* or Sozialstaat* or Wohlfahrtsstaat* or Souverän* or (national* adj1 Unabhängigkeit) or Gewaltmonopol or Parlamentarismus or Konkurrenzdemokratie or Konsensdemokratie or Parteiendemokratie or Parteienstaat* or Parteiensystem* or Verbändesystem* or Föderal* or Bundesstaat* or Wahlsystem*) same (Menschenrecht* or Grundrecht* or Freiheit or Völkerrecht* or reversib* or irreversib* or nachhaltig* or umkehrbar* or unumkehrbar or befähig* or aktivier* or (gleich* adj1 Chancen) or Chancengleichheit or effektiv* or ineffektiv* or Erfolg* or Scheiter* or Versag* or Reform* or Stillstand* or Blockade* or Blockier* or ineffizien* or effizien* or kosten-nutzen or gerecht* or ungerecht* or (gleich* adj1 (Recht or Recht$1)) or Gleichheit or ungleich* or fair* or unfair* or solidari* or unsolidari* or unsozial* or stabil* or instabil* or Krise* or Integrati* or Desintegrati* or Verlässlich* or berechenbar* or unberechenbar* or Extrem* or Rechtsextrem* or Linksextrem* or Terroristisch* or Ruin or Zusammenbruch or identi* or Selbstverständnis* or (geteilt* adj1 Wert*) or (gemeinsam* adj1 Wert*) or legitim* or illegitim* or akzept* or inakzept* or Moral* or Unmoral* or Recht or Unrecht or glaubwürdig* or unglaubwürdig* or Scham or Schäm* or Stolz or Begeister* or Politikverdrossenheit or Parteienverdrossenheit)

UK

Search routine 1: (Britain or (United adj1 Kingdom) or (the adj1 UK) or politics or (polit* adj1 (system or order or class or elite*)) or (system adj2 government) or (form adj2 government) or (the adj1 state) or (British adj1 state) or nation or (British adj1 people) or monarchy or democracy or (rule adj2 law) or (legal adj1 order) or (legal adj1 system) or constitution or (welfare adj1 state) or sovereignty or (national adj1 independence) or (monopoly adj2 power) or parliamentarianism or (Westminster adj1 System) or (party adj1 system) or (party adj1 state) or (system adj2 (interest adj1 groups)) or (electoral adj1 system)

or devolution or (regional adj1 autonomy)) same ((popular adj1 sovereignty) or (sovereignty adj3 people) or (will adj3 people) or (rule adj3 people) or representa* or democrati* or undemocrati* or dictato* or tyran* or participat* or (concentration adj1 power) or argumenta* or deliberati* or discours* or discurs* or transparen* or intransparen* or secret or secrecy or accountab* or unaccountab* or responsib* or irresponsib* or justif* or (abuse adj2 power) or trust* or untrustworth* or (public adj1 interest) or legal or legally or legality or illegal* or lawful* or unlawful* or (according adj3 law) or (compliance adj3 law) or (contrary adj3 law) or constitutional* or unconstitutional* or corrupt* or charisma* or leadership or expert* or professional* or unprofessional* or competen* or incompeten* or amateur* or divine or God or holy or holiness or sanctity or christian* or (chosen adj1 people) or bible or biblical or tradition* or untradition* or convention* or unconvention* or customary or established or (human adj1 right*) or (fundamental adj1 right*) or (basic adj1 right*) or liberty or liberties or freedom* or (international adj1 law) or reversib* or irreversib* or sustainab* or unsustainab* or empower* or activat* or enabl*)

Search routine 2: (Britain or (United adj1 Kingdom) or (the adj1 UK) or politics or (polit* adj1 (system or order or class or elite*)) or (system adj2 government) or (form adj2 government) or (the adj1 state) or (British adj1 state) or nation or (British adj1 people) or monarchy or democracy or (rule adj2 law) or (legal adj1 order) or (legal adj1 system) or constitution or (welfare adj1 state) or sovereignty or (national adj1 independence) or (monopoly adj2 power) or parliamentarianism or (Westminster adj1 System) or (party adj1 system) or (party adj1 state) or (system adj2 (interest adj1 groups)) or (electoral adj1 system) or devolution or (regional adj1 autonomy)) same (effective* or efficac* or ineffective* or inefficac* or success or successful or unsuccessful or fail* or reform* or standstill or deadlock or gridlock or inefficien* or efficien* or unjust* or equal* or equit* or inequit* or fair or fairness or unfair* or equality or inequal* or unequal or solidar* or unsolidar* or stable or stability or instable or unstable or instability or crisis or crises or integrat* or disintegrat* or reliab* or unreliab* or predictab* or unpredictab* or erratic* or extremi* or terror* or collaps* or breakdown or identity or self-conception or (shared adj1 value*) or (common adj1 value*) or legitim* or illegitim* or acceptab* or unacceptab* or moral* or immoral* or justice or injustice or credib* or disgrace* or shame* or embarrass* or pride or proud or enthusias* or disenchant* or (political adj1 cynicism))

US

Search routine 1: (America or (United adj1 States) or (the adj1 U.S.) or nation or (American adj1 (government or people or state)) or ((form or system) adj2 government) or (political adj1 (class or elite* or order or system)) or politics or republic or (the adj1 state) or democracy or (bill adj2 rights) or constitution or (due adj1 process) or (legal adj1 (order or system)) or (rule adj2 law) or (welfare adj1 state) or (monopoly adj2 power) or (national adj1 independence) or sovereignty or (electoral adj1 system) or federalism or federation or (federal adj1 (order or state or system)) or (party adj1 system) or presidentialism or (presidential adj1 (government or system)) or (system adj2 (interest adj1 groups))) same (democrati* or undemocratic* or dictato* or (popular adj1 sovereignty) or representa* or (rule adj3 people) or (sovereignty adj3 people) or tyran* or (will adj3 people) or ((abuse or concentration) adj2 power) or grassroots or participat* or transparen* or intransparen* or secrecy or secret or accountab* or unaccountab* or responsib* or irresponsib* or justif* or (public adj1 interest) or trust* or ((according or compliance or contrary) adj3 law) or ((basic or fundamental or human) adj1 right*) or constitutional* or unconstitutional* or corrupt* or lawful* or unlawful* or legal or legally or legality or illegal* or argumenta* or deliberati* or discours* or discurs* or freedom* or (international adj1 law) or liberties or liberty or reversib* or irreversib* or

sustainab* or unsustainab* or activat* or empower* or enabl* or charisma* or leadership or customary or established or convention* or unconvention* or tradition* or untradition* or amateur* or competen* or incompeten* or expert* or professional* or unprofessional*)

Search routine 2: (America or (United adj1 States) or (the adj1 U.S.) or nation or (American adj1 (government or people or state)) or ((form or system) adj2 government) or (political adj1 (class or elite* or order or system)) or politics or republic or (the adj1 state) or democracy or (bill adj2 rights) or constitution or (due adj1 process) or (legal adj1 (order or system)) or (rule adj2 law) or (welfare adj1 state) or (monopoly adj2 power) or (national adj1 independence) or sovereignty or (electoral adj1 system) or federalism or federation or (federal adj1 (order or state or system)) or (party adj1 system) or presidentialism or (presidential adj1 (government or system)) or (system adj2 (interest adj1 groups))) same (bible or biblical or (chosen adj1 people) or christian* or (city adj3 hill) or divine or god or holy or holiness or sanctity or efficien* or inefficien* or deadlock or efficac* or inefficac* or effective* or ineffective* or fail* or gridlock or reform* or standstill or success or successful or unsuccessful or equal* or inequal* or equit* or inequit* or unequal or fair or fairness or unfair* or justice or injustice or unjust* or solidar* or unsolidar* or breakdown or collaps* or cris?s or integrat* or disintegrat* or erratic* or extremi* or stability or instability or predictab* or unpredictab* or terror* or reliab* or unreliab* or stable or instable or unstable or untrustworth* or ((common or shared) adj1 value*) or identity or self-conception or acceptab* or unacceptab* or credib* or disenchant* or disgrace* or embarrass* or enthusias* or legitim* or illegitim* or moral* or immoral* or (political adj1 cynicism) or pride or proud or shame* or untrustworth*)

National time series: In order to manage the amount of potentially relevant text, we applied an intensity sampling procedure and limited the analysis to information-rich time periods with presumably high public attention to national political systems:

- CH: presentation, parliamentary and media discussion of the so-called *Jahresziele* ("annual objectives);
- DE: presentation, parliamentary and media discussion of the Chancellor's budget proposal;
- UK: Speech from the Throne and its parliamentary and media discussion;
- US: State of the Union Address and its parliamentary and media discussion.

The time windows around these events used are shown in Table 2.

The same search routines as for the national monitoring were used. However, we now had to rely on F.A.Z.-BiblioNet (with 300 letters per search request and, in general, less flexible search features), which made it necessary to somewhat adapt the routines described above. Specifically, the SAME operator had to be replaced with the AND operator, and given the length restriction of the search string, we had to split up the search routines even more. The search results are, however, comparable as this slight modification only results in a higher number of false positives.

International time series: Once again, we used intensity sampling around events that presumably focus public attention on the three international regimes examined:

- EU: one of its summits for each year in the observation period (the one summit with the highest output using the search routine below);
- G7/8: its annual summit;
- UN: the annual meeting of its General Assembly in New York.

The time windows are shown in Table 3.

Table 2: Time Windows, National

	National Political Orders										
	CH		DE		GB		US	
	Date	Period	Date	Period	Date	Period	Date	Period
1998	07/12	05/12-16/12	10/11	07/11-18/11	24/11	21/11-02/12	27/01	24/01-04/02
1999	13/12	11/12-22/12	24/11	20/11-01/12	17/11	13/11-24/11	19/01	16/01-27/01
2000	11/12	09/12-20/12	28/11	25/11-06/12	06/12	02/12-13/12	27/01	22/01-02/02
2001	03/12	01/12-12/12	28/11	24/11-05/12	20/06	16/06-27/06	27/01	27/01-07/02
2002	26/11	23/11-04/12	04/12	30/11-11/12	13/11	09/11-20/11	29/01	26/01-06/02
2003	01/12	29/11-10/12	26/11	22/11-03/12	26/11	22/11-03/12	28/01	25/01-05/02
2004	02/12	27/11-08/12	24/11	20/11-01/12	23/11	20/11-01/12	20/01	17/01-28/01
2005	28/11	26/11-07/12	30/11	26/11-07/12	17/05	14/05-25/05	02/02	29/01-09/02
2006	11/12	09/12-20/12	22/11	18/11-29/11	15/11	11/11-22/11	31/01	28/01-08/02
2007	03/12	01/12-12/12	28/11	24/11-05/12	06/11	03/11-14/11	23/01	20/01-31/01
2008	11/12	06/12-17/12	26/11	22/11 -03/12	03/12	29/11-10/12	28/01	26/01-06/02
2009	24/11	21/11-02/12	10/11	07/11-18/11	18/11	14/11-25/11	24/02	21/02-04/03
2010	30/11	27/11-08/12	24/11	20/11-01/12	25/05	22/05-02/06	27/01	23/01-03/02
2011	05/12	03/12-14/12	07/09	03/09-14/09	23/03	19/03-30/03	25/01	22/01-02/02

Again, the FAZ was unavailable in Factiva and, therefore, the less convenient F.A.Z.-Biblio-Net database which does not offer the SAME operator had to be used. In order to facilitate our searches, we only used LO dictionaries and dropped the LP portion of the routines – which, at worst, resulted in more false positives but did not otherwise affect the comparability of the national and international search routines.

The following routines were used:

EU

German search routine 1 (Factiva): (EU OR EG OR E.U. OR E.G. OR (europäisch* ADJ1 Union) OR Brüssel* OR (europäisch* ADJ1 gemeinschaft*) OR (europ* ADJ1 bürger*) OR

(europ* ADJ1 (Parlament* OR Rat* OR Ministerrat* OR Kommission OR Gerichtshof OR Verträg* OR Verträge* OR Institutionen)) OR EuGH*)

German search routine 2 (F.A.Z.-BiblioNet): EU, EG, E.U., E.G., (europäisch*&Union), Brüssel*, (europäisch*&gemeinschaft*), (europ*&bürger*), (europ*&Parlament*), (europ*&Rat*), (europ*&Ministerrat*), (europ*&Kommission), (europ*&Gerichtshof), (europ*&Vertrag*), (europ*&Verträge*), (europ*&Institutionen), EuGH*

English search routine: (EU OR EC OR E.U. OR E.C. OR (European ADJ1 Union) OR Brussels OR (European ADJ1 communit*) OR (European ADJ1 (citizens* OR parliament* or council* or commission or Court OR treaty OR treaties OR institutions)) OR ECJ OR E.C.J.)

G8

German search routine 1 (Factiva): (G8 OR „G 8" OR „G-8" OR G-8-* OR G8-* OR „Gruppe der Acht" OR „Gruppe der acht" OR G7 OR „G-7" OR G-7-* OR G7-* OR "Gruppe der Sieben" OR „Gruppe der sieben" OR Weltwirtschaftsgipfel* OR Wirtschaftsgipfel* OR Fachministertreffen)

German search routine 2 (F.A.Z.-BiblioNet): „G8", „G 8", G-8, „Gruppe der Acht", „Gruppe der acht", „Fachministertreffen", G7, „G 7", G-7, „G-7-*", G7-*, „Gruppe der Sieben", „Gruppe der sieben", „Weltwirtschaftsgipfel*", „Wirtschaftsgipfel*", „Fachministertreffen"

English search routine: (G8 OR „G 8" OR "G-8" OR G-8-* OR G8-* OR „Group of Eight" OR „Group of the Eight" OR „group of eight" OR G7 OR "G 7" OR G-7 OR G-7-* OR G7-* OR "Group of Seven" OR "Group of the Seven" OR "group of seven" OR "world economic summit" OR "economic summit" OR "ministerial meeting")

UN

German search routine 1 (Factiva): ("UN" or U.N. or UNO or U.N.O. or VN or V.N. or (Vereinte* adj1 Nationen) or Staatengemeinschaft or Völkergemeinschaft or Weltgemeinschaft or Weltorganisation or (Gemeinschaft adj2 (Menschen or Nationen or Staaten or Völker)) or ((Menschen or Nationen or Staaten or Völker) adj2 Erde) or Menschheit or (UN or U.N. or UNO or U.N.O. or VN or V.N.) adj10 (Generalsekretär* or Sicherheitsrat* or SR or Generalversammlung or Treuhand*) or Kofi or Annan or GV or (Wirtschafts* adj2 Sozialrat) or ECOSOC or E.C.O.S.O.C. or (Internationale* adj1 Gerichtshof))

German search routine 2 (F.A.Z.-BiblioNet): UN, U.N., UNO, U.N.O., VN, V.N., „Vereinte*Nationen", Staatengemeinschaft, Völkergemeinschaft, Weltgemeinschaft, Weltorganisation, Generalsekretär*, Sicherheitsrat*, SR, Generalversammlung, Treuhand*), „Kofi Annan", GV, ECOSOC*, E.C.O.S.O.C., „Internationale* Gerichtshof"

English search routine: (UN or U.N. or UNO or U.N.O. or (United adj1 Nations) or (community adj2 (nations or peoples or states)) or (international adj1 community) or (world adj1 (community or organi?ation or society)) or ((nations or people* or states) adj3 (earth or world)) or (secretary adj1 general) or secretary-general or Kofi or Annan or (general adj1 assembly) or GA or (social adj1 council) or ECOSOC or E.C.O.S.O.C. or international adj1 (court or tribunal) or security adj1 council or SC or Trusteeship adj1 council)

Table 3: Time Windows, International

	International Political Orders							
	G7/8			EU			UN	
	Location	Date	Period	Location	Date	Period	Date	Period
1998	Birmingham	15/05-17/05	09/05-20/05	Vienna	11/12-12/12	05/12-16/12	21/09-02/10	21/09-02/10
1999	Cologne	18/06-20/06	12/06-23/06	Berlin	24/03-25/03	20/03-31/03	20/09-02/10	20/09-02/10
2000	Okinawa	21/07-23/07	15/07 -26/07	Nice	07/12-10/12	02/12-13/12	12/09-22/09	12/09-22/09
2001	Genoa	20/07-22/07	14/07-25/07	Laeken	14/12-15/12	08/12-19/12	10/11-16/11	08/11-18/11
2002	Kananaskis	26/06-27/06	22/06-03/07	Seville	21/06-22/06	15/06-26/06	12/09-20/09	11/09-21/09
2003	Évian	01/06-03/06	28/05-07/06	Brussels	12/12-13/12	06/12-17/12	23/09-02/10	23/09-03/10
2004	Sea Island	08/06-10/06	05/06-16/06	Brussels	25/03-26/03	20/03-31/03	21/09-30/09	21/09-01/10
2005	Gleneagles	06/07-08/07	02/07-13/07	Brussels	16/06-17/06	11/06-22/06	14/09-19/09	14/09-24/09
2006	St. Petersburg	15/07-17/07	08/07-19/07	Lahti*	20/10	14/10-25/10	19/09-27/09	18/09-28/09
2007	Heiligendamm	06/06-08/06	02/06-13/06	Brussels	21.06-22/06	16/06-27/06	25/09-03/10	24/09-04/10
2008	Tōyako	07/07-09/07	05/07-16/07	Brussels	19/06-20/06	14/06-25/06	23/09-27/09	20/09-01/10
2009	L'Aquila	08/07-10/07	04/07-15/07	Brussels	29/10-30/10	24/10-04/11	23/09-29/09	19/09-30/09
2010	Huntsville	25/06-26/06	19/06-30/06	Brussels	07/05	01/05-12/05	23/09-29/09	21/09-01/10
2011	Deauville	26/05-27/05	21/05-01/06	Brussels	08/12-09/12	03/12-14/12	21-24 & 26-27/09	17/09-28/09

* Special summit with Russia.

Economic time series: While it may be possible to identify certain events or scandals that occasionally put economic regimes on top of media agendas and trigger intense legitimation discourses, it is harder to pin down regular focusing events of the kinds used for the (inter)national time series. Therefore, the amount of textual data was reduced with the help of a stratified random sampling technique in the construction of the economic time series. For a representative sample, we considered four constructed weeks per year and newspaper. The term 'constructed week' refers to seven non-consecutive (or not necessarily consecutive), randomly selected weekdays (one Monday, one Tuesday, and so forth). Although extant research suggests that as few as two constructed weeks per year are a representative sample, the decision to use four weeks is more conservative.

First, the years of our observation period were split into their four quarters to account for possible seasonal variation of pertinent coverage notably following the economic business cycle. Secondly, for each quarter, a constructed week was generated with the help of a random number generator to account for the weekly production cycles of daily newspapers. Hence, one Monday, one Tuesday, etc., was chosen from among all the respective weekdays in each 3-month period. This procedure was performed independently for all eight newspapers.

The following search routines were then used for a preselection of articles potentially dealing with the legitimacy of the economic regime of market capitalism:

German search routine 1 (Factiva): marktwirtschaft* or kapitalis* or wirtschaftsordnung* or wirtschaftssystem* or marktordnung* or marktsystem* or (ökonom* adj1 system*) or (ökonom* adj1 ordnung*) or wettbewerbssystem* or wettbewerbsordnung*

German search routine 2 (F.A.Z.-BiblioNet): marktwirtschaft*, kapitalis*, wirtschaftsordnung*, wirtschaftssystem*, marktordnung*, marktsystem*,("ökonom* system*"), ("ökonom* ordnung*"), wettbewerbssystem*, wettbewerbsordnung*

English search routine (Factiva): (market adj1 econom*) or capitalis* or (econom* adj1 order*) or (econom* adj1 system*) or (market adj1 organization*) or (market adj1 system*) or (compet* adj1 order*) or (compet* adj1 system)*

III   Coding scheme, procedures and rules

Unless indicated otherwise, the following variables were coded for the legitimation statements in all four text corpora, using the same coding scheme: national monitoring, (inter)national and economic time series.

In phase I of the research project, statements were coded by individual team members and ambiguous cases discussed in groups of at least three persons including the initial coder before final coding decisions were made. In phases II and III, we used a two-step procedure in which statements were independently coded by two coders. In the first step, a coder identified and coded relevant statements. Subsequently, the identified statements were presented to a second person who coded the statements again, without any information on the decisions of the first coder. Then, the results were compared and matching coding decisions were considered final. Diverging coding decisions were given to the project manager for final decisions. The rationale of this procedure is to maximize inter-coder reliability. However, we also performed standard reliability tests with satisfactory results for the variables related to our legitimation "grammar" (as indicated below).

Variables and explanations:

The following set of variables – whose coding did not raise issues of reliability – were coded by research assistants, or values were in some cases assigned automatically by the MaxQDA software used to store articles. These variables identify statements and help to locate them in in the text corpora.

AID

Identification number of the article from which the legitimation statement was taken, assigned in the order in which articles were imported to MaxQDA. There is a separate range of identification numbers for each of the newspapers in the sample:

10000 and ff.	Neue Zürcher Zeitung
20000 and ff.	Tagesanzeiger
30000 and ff.	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
40000 and ff.	Süddeutsche Zeitung
50000 and ff.	Guardian
60000 and ff.	Times
70000 and ff.	New York Times
80000 and ff.	Washington Post

CID

The *consecutive* identification number of each legitimation statement was assigned chronologically, the first statement in the earliest relevant article in 1998 receiving number 1, etc.

TEXTNAME

String variable with the title of the article from which the legitimation statement was taken, as given by the electronic newspaper databases (generated automatically by MAXQDA).

DAY

Calendar day on which the article containing the legitimation statement was published (1-31).

MONTH

Month in which the article containing the legitimation statement was published (1-12).

YEAR

Year in which the article containing the legitimation statement was published.

DATE

Complete publication date of the article containing the legitimation statement in the form yyyy/mm/dd.

COUNTRY

Country of origin of the newspaper from which the legitimation statement was taken:

1	CH
2	DE

3   UK
4   US

SOURCE

The newspaper from which the legitimation statement was taken:

CH

1   Neue Zürcher Zeitung
2   Tagesanzeiger

DE

3   Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
4   Süddeutsche Zeitung

UK

5   Guardian
6   Times

US

7   New York Times
8   Washington Post

PARNUM

Number of the paragraph containing the legitimation statement (generated automatically by MaxQDA).

The following, more complicated and substantive variables – which are mostly derived from our legitimation "grammar" – were coded by the trained members of the research team.

SYSTEM LEVEL [version 1, only (inter)national time series; see LO, version 1]

This variable allows researchers to distinguish evaluations of the four national political regimes from assessments of the three international regimes if the national and international time series are merged. Examples: system level = 1 and LO (see below) = 10 → the Swiss political order as a whole is evaluated; system level = 6 and LO = 43 → the European Parliament is assessed.

1   CH
2   DE
3   UK
4   US
5   G8
6   EU
7   UN

SYSTEM LEVEL [version 2, economic time series; see LO, version 2]

This variable refers to the geographical scope (or nature) of legitimation statements. These may assess *national* versions of any of the LO listed below, *international* (European, Western, or global) versions (where this national, European, Western [OECD], or global scope is made explicit), or LO as *abstract principles and ideal types*. Example: system level = 1 and LO = 14 → Swiss financial capitalism.

Any statements that could not be assigned to one of these categories (for instance, evaluations of the French economy, Asian capitalism, or economic LO below the national level) were discarded.

1   CH
2   DE
3   UK
4   US
5   European (EU and beyond)
6   Western (OECD)
7   global (world)
8   abstract (ideal type)

LO [version 1, national monitoring, (inter)national time series]

As indicated above (and with the exception indicated below), only legitimation objects at the regime and political community level were considered; however, we use a fine-grained coding scheme for these legitimation objects that covers more specific objects than suggested by the search routines presented above. These objects are located at different levels of an object hierarchy, a notion that we adopted from public opinion research on legitimacy and regime support: regime or political community as a whole; core institutions and variants of democracy; key groups of actors.

100   political system as a whole, without further specifications

(Typical, selected) key words: the official name of a political regime ("Federal Republic of Germany", "European Union"), a synonym or abbreviation of that name ("G8", "UN"), or a generic expression such as "the American system of government" is used.

200   political community as a whole, i.e., the *demos*, citizens, or people as opposed to institutional arrangements

Key words: "the American people", "our nation", "we Europeans", "people in the West", or "humankind".

(core dimensions and functions of the TRUDI state model)

Coding rule: These TRUDI dimensions and functions may also be ascribed to *international* regimes in legitimation statements, as in "European democracy".

310   democracy

Key words: "British democracy", "our system of popular government", or "[the UN as a] global democracy".

320   nation state

Coding rule: Do not confuse with references to the *nation* as a political community (LO 20); this item is used exclusively for cases in which a political regime is explicitly characterized as a *nation state*.

Key words: "the German nation state", "the United States of Europe" (for the EU).

330   constitutionalism, rule of law

Coding rule: The constitutional foundations of and the rule of law in a political regime are highlighted. The category includes evaluations of constitutions and quasi-constitutional frameworks (European treaties, UN Charter) themselves.

Key words: "*Grundgesetz*" and "*Rechtsstaat*", "our legal order", "the rule of law" and "due process", "the treaties [of the EU]", or "the global constitution" (for the UN Charter).

340   state intervention, welfare state

Key words: "the Swiss welfare state", "the European social model".

350   sovereignty, territorial state

Coding rule: The political regime is characterized in terms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence, or the monopoly of (legitimate) coercion/use of force.

(core institutions of the political regime)

410   form of government

Coding rule: This category is used where either the monarchy (UK) or a republican form of government/governance are assessed. However, the term "republic" may also be shorthand notably for "the US political regime" or "Bundesrepublik Deutschland" and hence be coded as 10.

420   executive branch

Coding rule: This category is used in evaluations of the political executive (heads of state and government as well as their equivalents at the international level) and of (national, international) bureaucracies.

Key words: "executive branch", "administration", "European Commission", "UN Secretariat/Secretary-General".

430 legislative branch

Coding rule: This category is used for both chambers of parliament, where applicable. For the EU, the category only refers to the European Parliament. For the UN, it refers to the Security Council.

Key words: "Congress", *"Bundestag"*, "House of Lords".

440 judiciary

Coding rule: This category is used for the judicial system of an (inter)national political regime as a whole or for its highest courts, notably including Supreme (Constitutional) Courts.

Key words: "the judiciary", "the Law Lords", *"Bundesverfassungsgericht"*, "European Court of Justice" (no European courts not affiliated with the EU, such as the European Court of Human Rights), "International Court of Justice" (no international courts not affiliated with the UN, such as the International Criminal Court).

450 electoral system

Coding rules: This category is used for the electoral system used for representative bodies (national parliaments, EU Parliament, UN Security Council) of the given political regime, where applicable. For the EU, it refers only to the European Directive on Elections, not its varying national implementation. For the UN, the electoral system of non-permanent Security Council members is captured here.

Key words: "electoral law", "first-past-the-post system".

460 federalism, territorial organization

Coding rule: This category is used for evaluations of federal arrangements or other forms of decentralization.

Key words: "federalism", "devolution", "regional autonomy", or "subsidiarity principle".

470 central banks

Key words: "FED", "Bundesbank", or "European Central Bank".

480 summits [only international time series]

Coding rule: This category refers to summits/meetings that play a central role in the governance of a political regime; the category is also used for evaluations of the UN General Assembly.

Key words: "European summit" (and references to the Council of the European Union), "G8 summit".

490   miscellanous [only international time series]

Coding rule: used for evaluations of the Council of Ministers (EU), ministerial meetings (G8), and ECOSOC or Trusteeship Council (UN).

(types of democracy)

Coding rule: As always, the coders do not make decisions as to which type of democracy "correctly" describes the political regime in question but consider its framing in the text. Thus, while it is unlikely to see the UK described as a presidential democracy and the US as a parliamentary democracy, Germany may very well be referred to either as a consensus or as a Westminster democracy, and both the representative or the plebiscitary elements of Swiss democracy may be highlighted by authors; LO are coded according to the manifest content.

510   parliamentary democracy, parliamentary system, parliamentarism

Key words: "British parliamentarism", "our parliamentary form of government".

520   presidential democracy, presidential system; presidentialism

530   direct, grassroots or plebiscitary democracy; ballot initiatives, recall, referenda

540   representative democracy

550   Westminster, competitive or majoritarian democracy [time series only]

560   consensus or veto democracy [time series only]

570   comitology or committee democracy [time series only]

Coding rule: notably used for "European comitology" and references to the institutional arrangements of the Open Method of Coordination.

590   other [monitoring only]

(groups of actors)

610   political class/elite(s)

Coding rule: This category refers to the political class/elite(s), the "ruling class", etc., as a collective category, not to particular individuals.

620   party system

Coding rule: This category refers to the entire party system, to "the parties" of a political regime or to "party democracy", not to specific parties or their representatives.

630   organized interests, interest group system, corporatism

Coding rule: This category is used wherever an explicit reference is made to the interest group system as a whole (not: specific interest groups such as "DGB", "NAACP", etc.), its political functions or its relationship with the core political institutions and actors.

Key words: "special interests", "organized interests", "lobby groups", "corporatism", "the social partners".

640   Member states [not relevant for national monitoring, time series]

Coding rule: This category refers to the member states as a collective category. Do not confuse this category with the system as whole (10) and the political community as a whole (20).

LO [version 2, economic time series]

In assessments of the capitalist market economy and its elements, the following legitimation objects (again, at different levels of an object hierarchy) were considered.

115   economic regime as a whole, without further specifications

Coding rule: only used where the LO is unspecific, such as "the economy" or "our economic order".

125   market economy

Coding rule: The economic regime is explicitly referred to as "market economy" or "Marktwirtschaft".

135   capitalism, capitalist economy

Coding rule: The economic regime is explicitly referred to as "capitalist" or "capitalism".

145   financial capitalism

Coding rule: The (current) economic regime is explicitly characterized as "financial" (as opposed to "industrial", etc.) capitalism. More specific actors or institutions related to financial markets are coded using one of the categories listed below.

(core principles of the capitalist market economy)

These are the principles that define the capitalist market economy as a regime; they are therefore often (but not necessarily) evaluated as abstract principles (system level = 8).

215   market

Coding rule: references to "the market" as a principle, not (for instance) "the British market for poultry" and the like.

225   competition, mechanism of free price formation

235   private property (rights)

245   freedom of contract

255   profit orientation, maximization

265   free trade

Coding rule: No evaluations of "globalization" are considered here (or in other categories).

(core institutions of the capitalist market economy)

Our coding scheme for core institutions makes two basic distinctions:

1. Actor-based and structure-based institutions: Actor-based institutions are characterized by membership. Hence, they can be described as organizations or collective actors. Membership and features of collective actors are lacking in structure-based institutions; we consider only two such institutions of the financial sector.
2. Economic and political-economic institutions: We make this distinction to include some of the latter institutions, which are crucial for the functioning of the economic regime, notably central banks.

Table 4: Core institutions of the capitalist market economy

	Economic	Political-economic
Actor-based	31	33
Structure-based	32	34

315   actor-based economic institutions

Coding rule: This category refers to actor-based economic institutions, especially companies, as well as institutions related to the financial sector such as banks, funds, insurance companies, and stock markets – however, no specific companies (for instance, "General Motors"). The "City" or the "German financial economy" are not considered organizations and therefore coded as LO 32.

Key words: "German banks", "US hedge funds", or "the global stock market".

325   structure-based economic institutions

Coding rule: used for explicit references to a national, international, or global financial market or the ideal type of it.

Key words: "the global financial system".

335   actor-based political-economic institutions

Coding rule: Institutions that matter for the financial sector such as bank supervision are captured by this category; institutions concerned with the supervision of a particular branch are not considered.

Key words: "bank supervision", "central banks".

345   structure-based political-economic institutions

Coding rule: In our research we focus solely on institutions and rules of financial market regulation. If a specific organization is evaluated, LO 33 is used.

(varieties of capitalism)

This category is used if an explicit reference is made to a variety of market economy or capitalism (not to alternative economic regimes such as a planned economy or socialism).

415   liberal market economy (free market economy, Anglo-Saxon capitalism, free market capitalism, neoliberal economy)

425   coordinated market economy (social market economy, Rhenish capitalism, Keynesian economic regime)

495   others (ecological market economy, green economy, mixed economy, socialist market economy)

(economic actors)

Coding rule: This LO is used if an explicit reference is made to the following groups or types of economic actors: economic elites, capitalists, managers, bankers, entrepreneurs, employers, and employees.

EVALTYPE [only G8 time series]

This category was only used in the G8 study, for which we also identified and coded evaluations of policies and authorities.

1   policy

Example: "the G8's action plan on climate change".

2   authority

Example: "the [acting] chair of the G8".

3   regime

DRLEG

Positive or negative character of the evaluation.

-1   delegitimation
1   legitimation

LP [version 1, (inter)national time series]

We distinguish four groups of legitimation criteria, that is, four groups of normative bench-marks on the basis of which positive (legitimating) or negative (delegitimating) evaluations may be justified. In the first dimension, we distinguish between input and output criteria. Input criteria are related to the processes and procedures of decision-making. Output criteria are related to the result of these decision-making processes, their quality, and their consequences. In the second dimension, we distinguish between criteria of democratic quality and all others (the latter are not necessarily *anti*-democratic, but a regime with high democratic quality may be found wanting in terms of them while an authoritarian regime may also satisfy them; Table 5).

Table 5: Overview of legitimation criteria

	criteria of democratic quality	**other criteria**
input criteria	popular sovereignty participation deliberation transparency accountability legality international legality credibility community/people/demos	(charismatic) leadership expertocratic leadership religious authority traditional processes moderation capability seriousness
output criteria	protection of human rights reversibility democratic empowerment contribution to public good	efficacy/effectiveness efficiency distributive justice contribution to stability contribution to identity contribution to morality national sovereignty/power good international standing innovation relevance/good agenda

Note that each of these criteria may be used in two ways. A legitimation object may be legitimated (and conversely, delegitimated) either because a specific criterion is met or because it is *not* met. This may sound counter-intuitive because for many of the criteria listed above it seems clear that *more* is unequivocally 'good' (and hence should be linked to legitimation) and *less* is 'bad' (and hence linked to delegitimation): For instance, we should usually expect statements that *confirm* an aspect of democratic quality to be positive and vice versa. However, this need not always be so. The *absence* of popular sovereignty may become the foundation of a positive evaluation in the eyes of an authoritarian speaker or where, for instance, an expert body and its decision-making procedures are assessed. For other criteria, such as tradition or religious authority, it is even less clear *a priori* whether their presence or their absence has an affinity with either legitimating or delegitimating statements. Respect for tradition may be a 'good' thing for some and a 'bad' one (thus called 'outdated', etc.) for others, and the same holds for religious authority.

Therefore, there are two codes for each legitimation criterion (x01, x02). The x01 code signifies that the speaker considers the *presence* of a criterion as an adequate justification for a

positive evaluation (legitimation); the x02 code signifies that the *absence* is considered an adequate justification. Both ways of using a legitimation criterion may, then, result in legitimating or delegitimating statements, as captured in the DRLEG variable. Examples: DRLEG = 1 and LP = 101 → LO was evaluated positively because it respects/lives up to the criterion of popular sovereignty. DRLEG = -1 and LP = 211 → LO evaluated negatively because it *does not provide enough* expertocratic leadership. DRLEG = -1 and LP = 212 → LO evaluated negatively because *there is too much* expertocratic leadership.

In the following descriptions, the formulations indicate what would lead to a positive evaluation on the basis of the respective criterion. The formulations for the x02 versions of each criterion are in square brackets. Finally, while the LP dictionaries described above often are useful starting points for the identification of value-laden, LP-related language, any number of expressions may be used to refer to a given criterion.

(input criteria, democratic)

101 [102] popular sovereignty

> An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision taken by citizens ("the people") or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that guarantees this kind of popular sovereignty. Representation may be acceptable if citizens can control the decision makers (i.e., the chain of representation does not become too long) and accept them as their representatives. What is not acceptable is that a decision is taken by a person whose power is justified by any other consideration than the will of the people.

> Coding rules: Applicable if democracy or the democratic character of an LO are referred to without any further specification. This category also encompasses references to the representative character of an LO.

> Key words: "(un)democratic", "the will of the people", "representative", or "tyranny".

111 [112] participation

> An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision-making process in which a large number of actors can take part or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of participation. Participation need not necessarily be universal. This pattern of legitimation may also refer to the participation not of "the people" but of a certain group of people. In some arguments, the *possibility* to participate may be considered sufficient, even if it is not in fact realized.

> Coding rule: encompasses the aspect of equal participation in political processes. However, distributive justice (421) is applicable in all cases in which equality is referred to without any specific reference to participation in political processes.

121 [122] deliberation

> An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision-making process in which reasons are exchanged in a discursive fashion or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of deliberation.

Participation in deliberative procedures need not be universal. What is important is that – contrary to processes of acclamation, aggregation, or bargaining – the individual preferences of the participants are not simply summed up or weighed, but are supported or questioned by arguments and reason-giving. In the exchange of arguments, preferences are open to revision and change.

Coding rule: also applicable if the impartiality of political processes is discussed.

Key words: "[lack of] deliberation", "reasoned arguments", (as opposed to mere) "aggregation" and "bargaining".

131 [132] transparency

An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision-making process that can be followed and comprehended by the citizens or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of transparency. Again, transparency does not require that all citizens actually observe the decision-making process. However, it is of central importance that political decisions can be observed in principle, i.e. that they are made in public and according to publicly known procedures. These must not be exceedingly complicated in order to be understood by the citizens. Thus, citizens learn of all important decisions that are made and have the ability to scrutinize them.

Key words: "transparent", "opaque", "secret", "closed doors".

141 [142] accountability

An LO is legitimate because it results from [does not result from] a decision-making process in which the decision makers can be held responsible by the citizens or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of accountability. This guarantees the responsiveness of decision-makers to popular demands. Decision-makers can be removed from their positions and be replaced by other politicians if the citizens wish to do so. Citizens thus have a mechanism at their disposal to prevent the abuse or concentration of power. Institutional devises that ensure checks and balances between different branches or institutions of government also contribute to accountability.

Coding rule: also applicable when reference is made to the fact that citizens have a true choice between different political leaders that stand for different political positions and do not just represent the same elite group.

Key words: "(un)accountable", "responsible government", "responsiveness".

151 [152] legality

An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision-making process in which the applicable domestic legal and constitutional rules are respected or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of legality. According to this definition, legality refers only to the formal character of a decision-making process, measured against the background of the legal rules in place. These rules themselves need not fulfil any substantive criteria. The re-

quirement of legality ensures that all decisions are taken in compliance with domestic law, thus guaranteeing legal security (the rule of law and due process) and preventing unlawful action.

Coding rule: References to corruption and to *ad hoc* or arbitrary decision-making fall under this category.

161 [162] international legality

An LO is legitimate because it results from a decision-making process in which the applicable rules of international law are respected or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows for this kind of international legality. Again, legality refers only to the formal character of a decision-making process, measured against the background of the legal rules in place. These rules themselves need not fulfil any substantive criteria. The requirement of international legality ensures that all decisions are taken in compliance with international law.

171 [172] credibility

An LO is legitimate because it results from a decision-making process that is (or originates in decision-makers who are) considered trustworthy by the citizens or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of credibility. To gain the citizens' trust, decision rules must operate (and decision-makers must act) in ways that correspond to their stated objectives, as universally agreed on or explicitly promised. In addition to transparency and conformity with formal legal rules, this implies that no hidden agenda detrimental to the interests of the citizens is being followed, and that public statements and official declarations are truthful.

Coding rule: applicable if the citizens' trust in a political system/institution/ principle is referred to. However, code (500) is applicable if a statement only deals with the acceptance of (or disenchantment with) an LO.

Key words: "credible", "trustworthy".

181   community, people, *demos*

An LO is legitimate because it is [not] the expression of a political community, a people, or a *demos* on which it rests and for which it makes collectively binding decisions.

(input criteria, non-democratic)

201 [202] (charismatic) leadership

An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision taken by a leader possessing some exceptional personal qualities or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of charismatic leadership. A political system, institution, or principle is legitimate if political decisions are made by a person who is regarded as possessing heroic powers or other personal qualities not accessible to ordinary persons.

Key words: "charisma", "leadership", "personality".

211 [212] expertocratic leadership

An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision taken by persons possessing some particular expertise or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of expertocratic leadership. The experts' decisions do not necessarily have to be democratically controlled. Rather, the legitimacy of a decision is grounded in the exceptional (possibly scientific) knowledge of the decision makers. This expertise distinguishes them from other political actors ("ordinary people", "laypersons") who are less competent to professionally make the decision in question.

Key words: "competent", "amateur", "expert", "knowledgeable", "(un)professional".

221 [222] religious authority

An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision taken by political actors or "forces" possessing some qualities grounded in religion or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of religious authority to become operative. Political legitimation referring to religious arguments may be grounded in the divine/holy authority of particular political leaders or in the character of the whole population as a "chosen people". In the countries studied in our project, the religious arguments referred to will predominantly be Christian in origin.

Key words: "Christian", "holy", "sinful", "secular".

231 [232] traditional processes

An LO is legitimate because it comes [does not come] into being according to some conventional and well established process or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that respects these kinds of traditional processes. Traditional processes derive their authority from the fact that they have been operative for a long time and are thus considered "regular" and "normal". One example of such processes is rules of monarchical succession. However, this criterion is also applicable to processes that are followed in a customary way and of whose existence citizens only become aware if they are somehow amended or violated.

Coding rule: encompasses references to the "old" or "outdated" character of an LO.

Key words: "conventional", "customary", "well-established", "proven".

241 [242] moderation

An LO is legitimate because it results [does not result] from a decision-making process characterized by a non-aggressive and non-divisive style of political controversy or because its collectively binding decisions are [not] made in a procedure that allows this kind of moderation. If this condition is met, politics can be seen as a co-operative enterprise in which differences of opinion or interest are reconciled rather than fought

out. The absence of deep polarization in decision-making processes can also encourage the citizens to closely follow and actively take part in politics, as the unpleasant experience of sharp political controversy is avoided.

Coding rule: also used when disageement among the member states of an international regime or within a government is criticized.

Key words: "aggressive", "divisive", "moderate", "polarized".

251 [252] capability

An LO is legitimate because it has [does not have] the capability or power to bring about and to enforce collectively binding decisions. Often this is connected to the claim that *only* the given LO has this capability. This pattern is mainly found with respect to international organizations.

261 [262] seriousness

An LO is legitimate because it is [not] seen as a serious political body or because it works seriously at solving political problems. The LO is not just a show or media event.

Key words: "serious", "show", "talkshop".

(output criteria, democratic)

301 [302] protection of human rights

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that are in line with standards of human rights. As even decisions deriving from perfectly legitimate democratic procedures may endanger a person's individual rights, it is important to make sure that political decisions do not violate the basic liberties and fundamental rights of the person.

Coding rules: applicable if tolerance, liberties, freedom are referred to; also applicable where the paternalism of an LO is criticized as curtailing freedom.

Key words: "freedom", "basic rights".

311 [312] reversibility

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that may be reversed. Any irreversible decision restricts the freedom of future generations to take control of the conditions of their own life and thus violates the principle of sustainability.

321 [322] democratic empowerment

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that empower citizens – particularly disadvantaged groups – to become competent participants in future processes of democratic decision-making. Democratic empowerment, for instance, re-

quires minimal financial support for disadvantaged citizens in order to abolish structures of subordination and exploitation. Secondly, it also consists of measures to educate citizens in order to increase their competence to take part in and affect collectively binding decisions.

331 [332] contribution to public good

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that advance the public good of the political community. Thus, collectively binding decisions taken in a polity do not just benefit particular groups of the population but can be said to be in the common interests of all citizens, as opposed to special interests.

(output criteria, non-democratic)

401 [402] efficacy/effectiveness

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that meet the substantive goals they are supposed to meet or solves the problems it is supposed to solve. The substantive content of these goals can vary greatly. Furthermore, the goals need not be explicitly or unambiguously defined before the decision-making process is instigated. Rather, whether speakers consider an LO effective or not exclusively depends on their personal opinion about the goals it should serve. If these goals are met, the LO is legitimated according to the standard of effectiveness.

Coding rule: applicable in the case of general references to the ability of an LO to solve problems.

Key words: "(in)effective", "(un)successful", "state (government) failure".

411 [412] efficiency

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that are efficient, i.e., have an adequate cost-benefit ratio. Efficiency means that the resources spent to reach a certain objective are as small as possible, or the best possible output is produced with given resources. Again, the definition of the objective ultimately depends on the speaker's personal preferences. The resources taken into account in calculations of efficiency can be both the costs of decision-making processes and the costs to implement and carry out a decision.

421 [422] distributive justice

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that distribute benefits and burdens fairly among the population. Exactly which distribution amounts to distributive justice is controversial. However, every argument grounding the legitimacy of an LO in distributive justice stresses that each member or group of the population receives a fair share of rewards/benefits or has to carry a fair share of collective burdens. To achieve this state, some amount of redistribution of wealth among the citizens may be required, resulting in greater material equality.

Coding rules: applicable in all cases in which equality is referred to without any specific reference to participation in political procedures.

Key words: "(in)equality", "(un)fair", "solidarity".

431 [432] contribution to stability

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that are stable or enhance social and political stability. A high amount of stability is indicated by the solid integration of diverse individuals and groups into society and by the absence (or effective repression) of extremist – possibly terrorist – political forces fighting for an overhaul of the political system. Stability increases the reliability and predictability of politics. If stability is lacking, the political system operates in a permanent state of crisis and the possibility of its collapse poses a constant threat. On the other hand, stability may also mean that a system is inflexible when it comes to reacting to newly emerging concerns.

Coding rule: also applicable where the predictability guaranteed by an LO is referred to.

441 [442] contribution to identity/integration

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that contribute to the reproduction of the political community's collective identity. A collective identity consists of a common self-conception of the community and values shared by (most of) its members. This self-conception might be based on some particular values considered central for the society or on a particular conception of the good life.

451 [452] contribution to morality

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that are considered in agreement with universal standards of morality. The standards of morality applied may vary between individual speakers. What distinguishes moral standards from other criteria used to judge political outputs is that they are presented as universal rules of correct or decent behavior that do not just apply to a particular group of people but to all human beings.

461 [462] national sovereignty/power

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that protect or enhance the polity's independence in the international system. This pattern can refer both to a polity's legal sovereignty (recognition as an independent state according to international law) and to its factual sovereignty (power to take decisions in the domestic and international realm without being dependent on the support/agreement of other domestic and international actors).

471 [472] good international standing

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that protect or enhance the appreciation the polity enjoys in the international system. A polity with good (bad) international standing might be referred to as a well-respected member (pariah) of the international community. Standards for judging the international standing of a

polity may be both the behaviour of other polities' governments and public opinion in their societies.

Coding rule: If conformity with international law is referred to, international legality (161) is used.

481 [482] innovation

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outputs that are considered to be innovative.

Coding rule: Do not confuse this output pattern with the input criterion "traditional processes".

Key words: "[not] innovative", "creative".

491 [492] relevance/good agenda

An LO is legitimate because its outcomes tackle [do not tackle] relevant political problems or result from a good agenda.

500   unspecific legitimation statements

Some legitimation statements are unspecific in that they do not make their legitimation criterion explicit. An LO is evaluated as legitimate/illegitimate, accepta-ble/unacceptable, something to be proud/ashamed of, etc., without specifying the pre-cise basis of this assessment.

600   other legitimation statements

A few statements could not be classified into any of their legitimation criterion was not frequent enough (i.e., too idiosyncratic) to warrant a new, separate category.

LO [version 2, economic time series]

Again, we distinguish between input and output criteria, as described above.

(input)

101 [102] popular control [as above]

171 [172] credibility [as above]

215 [216] virtues (vices)

An LO is legitimate either because it functions [does not function] rationally or in line with reasoned decision-making, or else in line with moral standards and virtues.

225 [226] personal freedom

An LO is legitimate because it guarantees [does not guarantee] negative (liberal) liberty. This LP captures arguments that justify an LO in terms of its protection of the free and unbiased participation of individuals in market activities. In addition, arguments that focus on more political/democratic arguments related to negative liberty such as freedom of speech fall under this LP.

235 [236] self-regulation

An LO is legitimate because it is [not] self-controlling or guarantees [does not guarantee] the self-control of the economic regime. This LP captures arguments that justify an LO on the basis of its non-hierarchical, unconstrained and spontaneous organizational form. With this LP, an LO is not described as the result of conscious invention or planning but as spontaneous result of human action. In this view, the state is only a night watchman that should not interfere with the market but only provide minimal guarantees.

245 [246] decentralization of power

An LO is legitimate because power is [not] diffused or decentralized rather than located in the hands of a few, or because it contributes to the decentralization of power.

285 [286] leadership [as above, 201/2]

(output)

301 [302] protection of human rights [as above]

311 [312] reversibility [as above]

325 [326] democratic stability

An LO is legitimate because it ensures [does not ensure] outcomes that empower citizens – particularly disadvantaged groups – to become competent participants in future processes of democratic decision-making. Democratic stability requires a minimum financial support for disadvantaged citizens in order to abolish structures of subordination and exploitation. Secondly, it also consists of measures to educate the citizens in order to increase their competence to take part in and collectively affect binding decisions.

331 [332] contribution to public good [as above]

441 [442] contribution to power

An LO is legitimate because increases [decreases] the power of actors or institutions. This LP refers to economic power but can also include other specific or unspecified forms of power.

405 [406] profit orientation

> An LO is legitimate because it contributes [does not contribute] to the economic profit of actors or institutions.

415 [416] efficiency, efficacy

> An LO is legitimate because it ensures outcomes that are efficient or effective (as defined above for the separate categories of efficiency, efficacy).

421 [422] distributive justice [as above]

435 [436]   contribution to welfare, well-being, wealth

> An LO is legitimate because it ensures outcomes that improve the quality of life of individuals or their personal utility.

> Coding rule: While LP 331/2 refers to the public good and the utility a community, this LP captures welfare effects for individuals.

485 [486] innovation

> An LO is legitimate because it ensures outcomes that are considered to be innovative or a result of creative entrepreneurship.

465 [466] economic stability

> An LO is legitimate because it ensures outcomes that are economically stable or enhance economic stability. Stability increases reliability and predictability. If stability is lacking, the social order operates in a permanent state of crisis and the possibility of its collapse poses a constant threat. On the other hand, stability may also mean that a system is inflexible when it comes to reacting to newly emerging concerns.

> Coding rule: also applicable where the predictability guaranteed by an LO is referred to.

455 [456] contribution to identity/integration [as above, 441/2]

500   general category, no explicit LP

600   other, none of the above

INT [national monitoring]

> This variable captures whether a legitimation statement is combined with a reference to internationalization; this reference has to be made in the same paragraph as the legitimation statement itself. For our purposes, internationalization comprises various (socio-economic, cultural, political, etc.) dimensions of globalization, continental and European integration, supra- and transnationalization.

1   contains such a reference
2   contains no such reference

DEP

This variable captures whether a legitimation statement is combined with a reference to deparliamentarization, i.e. diminishing political control and influence of national legislatures; the reference has to be made in the same paragraph as the legitimation statement itself. The variable comprises all forms and causes of deparliamentarization (in addition to internationalization), such as the transfer of responsibilities and power by way of/to:

(1) privatization (market, family, individuals);
(2) civil society, associations;
(3) organized interests, corporatist structures;
(4) executive, bureaucratization;
(5) judiciary, judicialisation;
(6) expert bodies, expertocracy.

1   contains such a reference
2   contains no such reference

CISSUE (version 1, national monitoring)

This variable provides information on the issue context of a legitimation statement. The subcategories of this variable refer to policy fields such as fiscal and economic policy, social policy and so on. CISSUE is coded on the basis of the paragraph containing the legitimation statement.

Coding rule: If no reference can be found in this paragraph, the immediately preceding and the leading paragraph of the article may be considered.

(fiscal and economic policy)

110   fiscal and economic policy (general; including macroeconomic policies)
112   budgetary and tax policy (including issues related to the EU budget and to the stability and growth pact)
113   monetary policy
114   financial market policy
120   trade policy (including deregulation policies of the EU or policies related to the completion of the single market, e.g. prohibition of subsidies, competition policies, the four freedoms)
130   industrial, regional, structural policy (including structural funds and cohesion funds)
150   agricultural policy
170   consumer policy
175   media and communications policy
190   other fiscal and economic policy areas

(infrastructural policy)

210   infrastructural policy (general)

220   transportation policy
230   housing policy
240   urban or rural (local) development policy
290   other infrastructural policy areas

(environmental policy)

310   environmental policy (general)
330   waste management policy
340   nature conservation policy
350   climate policy
380   biotechnology and biopolitics
390   other environmental policy areas
         (e.g. waste management policy, nature conservation policy)

(educational, research and cultural policy)

410   educational, research and cultural policy (general)
420   elementary and secondary education policy
430   higher education policy
440   research, technology and science policy
450   arts and culture
490   other educational, research and cultural policy areas

(social policy)

510   social policy (general)
530   health and long-term care policy
540   employment and labour market policy
550   welfare policy (including social assistance, family, youth, child care benefits pension
         and senior citizens policy; excluding labour market policy)
570   gender policy
590   other social policy areas

(other domestic policy)

610   domestic policy (general)
620   legal policy
630   public security (including the Schengen Agreement, police and judicial cooperation)
640   immigration policy
650   minorities, integration and citizenship (including nationalities/national minorities)
660   international crime
690   other domestic policy areas (e.g. media and communications policy)

(institutions/institutional processes)

710   institutions/institutional processes (general)
720   federalism, (decentralization, territorial organization, state/regional/local government)
730   executive and administrative processes
740   legislative processes

750   judicial and constitutional processes, civil rights
760   electoral system and parties
770   interest groups and social movements
780   institutional policy, const. reform (including decision making procedures)
790   other institutions and institutional processes

(foreign policy)

810   foreign policy (general)
820   security and defense policy
830   development aid and humanitarian aid
840   international organizations and regimes
855   European Union
865   European and North American affairs
870   Middle Eastern affairs
880   African, Asian, Pacific and Latin American affairs
890   other areas of international politics

(other issues)

910   no reference to a policy field, other issues

CISSUE (version 2, [inter]national time series)

(fiscal and economic policy)

110   fiscal and economic policy (general; including macroeconomic policies)
112   budgetary and tax policy (including issues related to the EU budget and to the stability
        and growth pact)
113   monetary policy
114   financial market policy
120   trade policy (including deregulation policies of the EU or policies related to the
        completion of the single market, e.g. prohibition of subsidies, competition policies, the
        four freedoms)
130   industrial, regional, structural policy (including structural funds and cohesion funds)
140   debt policy
150   agricultural policy
160   energy policy
170   consumer protection and industrial health and security
190   other fiscal and economic policy areas

(infrastructural policy)

210   infrastructural policy (general)
220   transportation policy
290   other infrastructural policy areas (e.g. housing policy, urban or rural development pol-
        icy)

(environmental policy)

310   environmental policy (general)
350   climate policy
380   biotechnology and biopolitics
390   other environmental policy areas
          (e.g. waste management policy, nature conservation policy)

(educational, research and cultural policy)

410   educational, research and cultural policy (general)
420   elementary and secondary education policy
430   higher education policy and research, technology and science policy
450   arts and culture
490   other educational, research and cultural policy areas

(social policy)

510   social policy (general)
530   health and long-term care policy
540   employment and labour market policy
550   welfare policy (including social assistance, family, youth, child care benefits pension
          and senior citizens policy; excluding labour market policy)
560   gender policy
590   other social policy areas

(other domestic policy)

610   domestic policy (general)
620   legal policy
630   public security (including the Schengen Agreement, police and judicial cooperation)
640   immigration policy
650   minorities, integration and citizenship
660   international crime
690   other domestic policy areas (e.g. media and communications policy)

(institutions/institutional processes)

710   institutions/institutional processes (general)
720   federalism, (decentralization, territorial organization, state/regional/local government)
730   executive and administrative processes
740   legislative processes
750   judicial and constitutional processes, civil rights
760   electoral system and parties
770   interest groups and social movements
780   institutional policy, const. reform (including decision making procedures)
790   other institutions and institutional processes

(foreign policy)

810   foreign policy (general)
820   security and defense policy
830   development aid and humanitarian aid
840   international organizations and regimes
850   enlargement policies
860   economic external relations (e.g. multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, European Neighbourhood Policy, association policies, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership)
890   other areas of international politics

(other issues)

910   no reference to a policy field, other issues

SPEAKER I-III variables [(inter)national and economic time series only]

These variables provide information on the speaker, i.e. the author of a legitimation statement (authorship may also be attributed to an individual or group by the media reporting the statement).

Coding rule: If one and the same legitimation statement is attributed to more than one speaker, one statement for each speaker has to be coded.

Example: Mr Sarkozy and Mrs Merkel both welcomed the informal atmosphere provided by G8 summits. → Mr Sarkozy welcomed… (LS 1); Mrs Merkel welcomed… (LS 2).

SPEAKER I (version 1, [inter]national time series)

This variable captures the political or societal position/function of the speaker.

100   journalists

(holders of political office [national])

210   government (unspecific)
220   president
230   prime minister/chancellor
240   minister/secretary
250   administration
260   military

310   legislature (unspecific)
320   member of parliament/Congress (majority/government coalition)
330   member of parliament/Congress (minority/opposition)

340   judiciary (unspecific)
350   Supreme Court justice
360   judge at another national court

390   other holders of a national political office

(holders of political office [international])

410   representative of the EU (unspecific)
420   EU Commission
430   EU Parliament
440   European Council
450   Court of Justice for the European Communities
460   EU, others

510   representative of the UN
520   representative of NATO
530   representative of WTO/GATT
540   representative of IMF
550   representative of the World Bank
560   representative of the G7/8

570   representative of UNCED/Rio/Kyoto

590   other holders of an international political office

(party [or party official])

610   government/majority party
620   party leaders of a government/majority party
630   opposition party
640   party leaders of an opposition party

690   other party-related speakers

(civil society)

710   speakers of NGOs
720   academia
730   arts and culture
740   religious communities
750   „ordinary" citizen (as individual, reader)

780   Other interest group representatives
790   other civil society speakers

815   business/corporate elite
820   business/employers' associations
830   trade unions

(collective categories)

910   the people, citizens, Germans/Swiss/British/Americans
940   the demonstrators
950   other collective categories

SPEAKER I (version 2, economic time series)

100   journalists

(holders of political office [national])

215   government/political executive
245   central banks
250   administration/military
255   market regulation agencies

320   parliament/parties – government side
330   parliament/parties – opposition side
340   judiciary/courts

390   other holders of a national political office

(holders of political office [international])

410   representative of the EU
510   representative of the UN
530   representative of the WTO
540   representative of the IMF
560   representative of the G8/20

581   left, anti-capitalist, anti-globalization individuals or groups (no further specification of the speaker in the text)
582   right, pro-capitalist, pro-globalization individuals or groups (no further specification of the speaker in the text)

590   other holders of an international political office

(economy)

810   representative of a corporation
820   representative of a business/employers' association
830   representative of a trade union

890   other economic actors

(civil society)

710   speaker of NGO/non-economic interest group
720   academia/public intellectual
730   arts and culture
740   religious community
750   "ordinary" citizen (as individual, reader)

790   other civil society representatives

910   the people, citizens, Germans/Swiss/British/Americans
940   demonstrators

990   others

If the specific function or role of a speaker is not clearly stated in a news story but the context of the story indicates that the speaker performs a specific political or economic, this variable is coded. In post-coding step student assistants investigate the role and insert the appropriate code.

SPEAKER II (version 1, [inter]national time series)

> This category only applies to speakers holding a national political office and political party officials.
> Coding rule: If the party membership of the speaker is not explicitly stated in the text, then the coder needs to research the party membership.

1   secular-conservative
2   liberal
3   Christian democrats and secular centre
4   social democrats
5   right-wing extreme
6   left-wing extreme
7   others

SPEAKER II (version 2, economic time series)

> This variable only applies to speakers who hold a national political office and to political party officials. We code this variable as a string variable and use the acronym of the party. In a post-coding step, acronyms are matched with the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data on political parties and recoded accordingly.
>
> Coding rule: If the party membership of the speaker is not explicitly stated in the text, then the coder needs to research the party membership.

SPEAKER III (version 1, [inter]national time series)

> This variable captures the origin of all speakers coded under SPEAKER I.

1   CH
2   DE
3   UK
4   US
5   France
6   Italy
7   Japan
8   Canada
9   Russia
10   Other EU countries, Europe
11   Other Western countries, OECD
12   Other non-Western countries

13   Several speakers of different categories

SPEAKER III (version 2, economic time series)

1   CH
2   DE
3   UK
4   US
5   Other EU countries, Europe
6   Other Western countries, OECD
7   Other non-Western countries
8   Several speakers of different categories

If the country of origin is not explicitly stated in the text, then the coder needs to research this piece of information.

SPEAKER IV

This string variable pertains to all coded speakers. It notes the name of the speaker as mentioned in the text. If the speaker is a single person and first name and last name are given in the text, the following format is used: Doe, John.

Coding rule: If the speaker is not a single person but an organization, the organization's name is noted.

Always use the most precise information given in the text. If there is the full name of a person and the name of the organization she stands for, note the name of the person. If there is the abbreviation of an organization and its full name use the full name.

IV   References

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