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Access to general social protection for immigrants in advanced democracies

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Abstract

Immigration has become a central socio-political issue in most advanced democracies. While research mainly focuses on immigrant-specific policies in the area of immigration, integration and citizenship, we still know very little on the incorporation of immigrants in mainstream social policies. By analyzing cross-national differences in the inclusion of immigrants to general social protection across 27 rich democracies based on comparative indicators from the MIPEX dataset we are seeking to address this gap in a quantitative study. A cross-national comparison of these indicators shows a particularly large variation in the inclusiveness of the access to social protection for immigrants across countries. By drawing on the welfare state and integration regime literature, we assess the power of welfare state regimes, left-wing governments, immigration flow and integration policies in explaining this large cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social security and social housing. Our results show that generous welfare states tend to provide immigrants with a more inclusive access to their general social protection schemes than less generous welfare states. This contrasts the view that immigrants are excluded in generous welfare states. Furthermore, general social protection is especially inclusive for immigrants in countries facing high levels of immigration flows. Strikingly, we find strong evidence that left-wing cabinets are particularly reluctant to open general social protection schemes to immigrants.

Keywords social protection, advanced democracies, immigration, integration

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1. Introduction

Immigration has become a central socio-political issue in most advanced democracies. Globalization has been rendering national borders increasingly porous, which has enhanced the border crossing of people: Advancements in telecommunication and social media technologies, democratization of travel means, growing international trade or global environmental problems are just a few reasons behind this growing international mobility. The spectacular refugee flow faced by the EU countries in 2015 and 2016 along the Balkan route illustrates this rapid increase in immigration flow over the last years. According to the OECD, the number of persons seeking asylum in one of the OECD countries reached a peak in 2015 at 1.65 million, representing an increase of 46% compared to 2013. Furthermore, the OECD estimates that 4.8 million persons entered OECD countries as permanent migrants in 2015, a 10% increase compared to 2014 (OECD, 2016). These impressive statistics clearly point to the relevance of the immigration issue for advanced democratic societies. In line with this societal development, immigration has also gained in importance in the political science(s) debate(s). The proliferation of comparative indexes measuring citizenship and integration regimes illustrates this rapidly growing area in political sciences (Goodman, 2015). While this boom mainly focuses on immigrant-specific policies in the area of immigration, integration and citizenship, we still know very little on the incorporation of immigrants in mainstream social policies. Understanding the varying national regulations on the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream policies such as social security or social housing policies is nevertheless an essential research avenue if we want to move beyond the burgeoning empirical literature on immigrant-specific policies. The study of immigrant-specific policies provides indeed only a partial picture on the national regulations facilitating or restricting immigrants' integration. In order to get a comprehensive picture, the empirical debate needs to consider national regulations on immigrants' access to mainstream policies as well. With this article, we aim at filling this gap by presenting the first quantitative analysis of immigrants' inclusion into general social protection. The overall social protection granted to immigrants depends not only on a country's social protection generosity but also on the extent to which immigrants benefit from equal access to social protection. Thus, immigrants' access to general social protection composes one of the two dimensions determining the overall social protection benefits granted to immigrants. For this purpose, we analyze indicators for the access to social security and social housing for different types of immigrant legal statuses from the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015) across 27 rich democracies. A cross-national comparison of these indicators shows a particularly large variation in the inclusiveness of the access to social protection for immigrants across countries. By drawing on the welfare state and integration regime literature, we assess the power of welfare state regimes, left-wing governments, immigration flow and integration policies in explaining this large cross-national variation in immigrants' access to social security and social housing. Our results show that generous welfare states tend to provide immigrants with a more inclusive access to their general social protection schemes which contrasts the view that immigrants are excluded in generous welfare states. Furthermore, general social protection is especially inclusive for immigrants in countries facing high levels of immigration flows. Strikingly, we find strong evidence that left-wing cabinets are particularly reluctant to open general social protection schemes to immigrants.

2. Social protection in international comparative perspective

Development of immigrants' social rights

The few studies dealing with the historical development of immigrants' social rights distinguish between three periods of welfare inclusion (e.g., Koning & Banting, 2013). The citizenship model of the early twentieth century composes the first period and is based on Marshall's conceptualization of rights (Marshall, 1950).¹ Accordingly, access to social rights is only possible through the acquisition of political rights – or citizenship. The second period started in the early 1990s and refers to the post-national welfare state model. Soysal's (1994) book "Limits of citizenship" best illustrates this period: as a result of the growing authority of supranational institutions and the global persistence of the human rights framework, residence status (has) replaced citizenship as the primary requirement for access to social rights. In a similar vein, Brubaker (1989, p. 156) observed that the main division line in the access to social services is not between citizens and non-citizens, but between permanent residents and the other immigrant legal statuses. Immigrants in the post-national welfare state model are therefore socially better protected than in the citizenship model. The last period, which started as soon as in the mid-1990s in some countries, has been labelled the welfare chauvinist model and is characterized by a general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism. Initiatives toward this welfare chauvinism were originally formulated by right-wing populist parties. In the meantime, some of these initiatives have been supported and implemented by various center and right-wing mainstream parties to counteract the electoral success of right-wing populist parties (Kymlicka, 2015). This general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism witnessed in several countries also encompasses the implementation of restrictive policies for immigrants' access to social protection. As a result, the division line between nationals and immigrants in social protection access gained again in salience in those countries. The rise of welfare chauvinism in several advanced democracies might explain the particular large cross-national variation in the eligibility rules for social protection for immigrants.

Contemporary variation of immigrants' access to general social policies across 27 countries

To capture the immigrants' integration into mainstream social policies we use a set of indicators provided by the MIPEX project for the year 2014 (Huddleston et al., 2015). The MIPEX project aims at providing comparative measures of policies to integrate migrants. It is constituted by 167 policy indicators that cover eight integration dimensions (labour market mobility, education, political participation access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination). The indicators have been collected yearly since 2010 in 34 countries. Unfortunately, the time span between the first and the latest data collection is too short to be able to measure the evolution of access to social protection over time. Therefore, we use the latest available year to describe the contemporary patterns of immigrants' integration into national mainstream social protection. Four out of the 167 MIPEX policy indicators measure the access to social security and housing for different immigrant legal status categories and are used to build our dependent variable on the access to social protection schemes. These four indicators can take the score of 100 (referring to the most inclusive access), of 50 (for countries with access restricted to some immigrant legal statuses or with some conditions to this access) and of 0 (for countries where only permanent

¹ See Kalm and Lindvall (2016) for the earlier period in the 19th century.

residents or none of the immigrant legal statuses are provided access). Table 1 presents the description of these indicators and their categories.

Table 1: Policy Indicator for Access to General Social Protection of Immigrants

Indicator number	Description of indicator	Score of 100	Score of 50	Score of 0
1	What categories of third country nationals have equal access to social security? (unemployment benefits, old age pension, invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance)	Long-term residents, temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) and residents on family reunion permits	Long-term residents and residents on family reunion permits or long-term residents and certain categories of residents on temporary work permits	Only long-term residents or none
2	Do family members have the same access to social security as their sponsor (unemployment benefits, old age pension, invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance)?	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	No access
3	What categories of third country nationals have equal access to housing benefits? (e.g., public/social housing, participation in housing financing schemes)	Long-term residents, temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) and residents on family reunion permits	Long-term residents and residents on family reunion permits or long-term residents and certain categories of residents on temporary work permits	Only long-term residents or none
4	Do family members have the same access to social housing as their sponsor? (e.g., public/social housing, participation in housing financing schemes)	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	No access

Source: The 2014 Migrant Integration Policy Index; available from <http://www.mipex.eu>

It should be noted that the three values of these indicators measure the eligibility for social security and social housing for different types of immigrant legal statuses. It is distinguished between long-term residents and other immigrant legal statuses, such as family reunion or temporary work permits. This implies a hierarchical conceptualization of immigrant legal statuses and the assumption that long-term residents benefit from the most inclusive access to social security and social housing. Immigrant entry categories involve indeed a varying access to social protection and lead thus to a hierarchical differentiation of immigrant legal statuses along their eligibility for social protection (Carmel & Cerami, 2011, p. 6; Sainsbury, 2006).

Similar to Corrigan (2014), we ran a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to assess the dimensionality of these four MIPEX indicators. These four indicators can be reduced into a single dimension, as the first dimension of the MCA explains 72.35% of their total variance. Furthermore, Cronbach’s alpha statistics for these four indicators is 0.815, suggesting a high internal consistency. Therefore, we computed for our dependent variable a scale by adding these four indicators and dividing the total score by 4. Our dependent variable thus measures the access to social housing and social security of different immigrant legal statuses and ranges from 0 (most restrictive access) to 100 (most inclusive access). This index does not capture the generosity of social policies provided, which might differ across nations. As mentioned earlier, the focus of our paper is on the access of immigrants to general social security schemes, and not on explaining the generosity of social policies, which would be an interesting but different research question.

Figure 1 shows the integration of immigrants into general social policies across 27 rich democracies (see also Table A1 in the appendix).

Figure 1: Integration of immigrants into general social policies




Figure 1 demonstrates that the integration score varies greatly across the 27 countries. Some countries such as Germany, Sweden, Canada and Estonia are highly inclusive in terms of integrating immigrants into general social policies. In contrast, Norway, the United Kingdom and Hungary are comparatively restrictive against incorporating migrants into social security and housing.

Interestingly, the restrictive (on the right hand side of Figure 1) as well as the inclusive country clusters (on the left hand side of Figure 1) contain countries from very different welfare regime types. For example, the cluster including countries with the most inclusive access for immigrants to social protection contains Scandinavian, liberal and corporatist welfare states as well as countries from Eastern Europe. At a first glance, general welfare state institutions and the integration of immigrants into public social protection seem not to be interrelated. In section 5, we will test whether this descriptive finding also holds within a quantitative statistical framework.

3. Theory and hypotheses

Cross-national differences in immigrants' access to general social protection can be best explained by considering two strands of research. Indeed, as Sainsbury (2012) convincingly argued, combining the literature on welfare state and on integration regimes enables us to better understand variation in the social protection access of immigrants across countries.

From the classical welfare state literature we know that cross-national variation in welfare policies can be explained to a large extent by the different welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The influence of general welfare state institutions is also discussed with respect to the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state. The literature discusses this relationship in two ways. From the first perspective, it is argued that cross-national variation in immigrants' access to general social protection follows a similar pattern to the cross-national variation in the overall social policies. According to Banting (2000, p. 25), "*countries that established a strong social regime, whether of social-democratic or corporatist complexion, have been more successful in incorporating new immigrants without eroding mass support for the welfare state.*" Countries with an expansive welfare state opted for more restrictive immigration policies and for a limited access to political citizenship rather than for a more restrictive social policy access to immigrants. By contrast, traditional immigration countries with less generous welfare states that rely more strongly on means-tested benefits have tended to provide immigrants with more restrictive access to social programs (Banting, 2000, p. 25). Furthermore, the level of generalized trust and social solidarity should (is expected to) be higher in countries with generous welfare state settings. This might also enhance the willingness of people to integrate immigrants into general social protection (Boräng, 2015, p. 216). Thus, immigrants' access to general social protection is expected to be more inclusive in countries with a corporatist or social-democratic welfare state regime than in countries with a liberal welfare state regime (H1a).

From a second perspective, the access to social rights for immigrants can be expected to be more restricted in countries with generous welfare states. According to this point of view, politicians restrict generous welfare state benefits to citizens in order not to lose the support of the non-immigrant majority. This form of welfare chauvinism or so-called internal exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state clearly separates citizens as insiders from immigrants outside the boundaries of the welfare state. As a consequence, generous welfare state might be more restrictive in including immigrants in general welfare policies (Boräng, 2015, p. 217) (H1b).

We test both competing perspectives empirically for a broad country sample and expect the overall welfare generosity to be positively (H1a) or negatively (H1b) associated with immigrants' access to general social protection.

A further factor that might influence the integration of immigrants into general social policy is the size of immigration flows. Countries facing large immigration flows are likely to restrict the access to general social protection for immigrants (Baldi & Goodman, 2013). Indeed, the costs of guaranteeing immigrants access to generous social protection directly depend on the size of the target population that would benefit from this access. Therefore, the inclusiveness of social protection to immigrants in a country is likely to vary along the level of immigration flow faced by this country. More precisely, we formulate the following hypothesis: the larger the immigration flow, the more restrictive immigrants' access to general social protection (H2). This hypothesis is in line with the aforementioned interpretation of Banting (2000) on country differences in the inclusiveness of social programs. Indeed, according to Banting (2000, p. 31), the traditional immigration countries that are also characterized by a liberal welfare state regime, such as Australia or the U.S., opted for a more restrictive access to social programs for immigrants.

A further hypothesis that can be drawn from the welfare state literature deals with political parties as policy makers. Indeed, as Sainsbury (2012, p. 260) showed in her qualitative comparison of the inclusion of immigrants in social policies of six countries, political parties in their capacity as office holders and policy makers turn out to represent central actors in drawing and implementing measures for the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in social programs. More precisely, inclusive vs restrictive policies toward immigrants' social protection can be retraced to a left-right policy divide (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 261). In other words, left-wing governments tend to implement more inclusive policies on immigrants' social rights than right-wing governments (Sainsbury, 2012). This leads us to formulate the first part of our third hypothesis: immigrants' access to social protection is expected to be more inclusive in countries with left-wing governments (H3a). On the other hand, we could also expect the reverse relation between left-wing governments and immigrants' access to social protection. Indeed, the traditional left-wing parties' electorate is composed of the blue-collar and lower classes. Members of these classes are much more likely than members of higher classes to perceive immigrants as competitors for scarce economic resources and as a threat to their cultural identity (Kriesi et al., 2008): individuals belonging to the blue-collar and lower classes endorse to a much larger extent anti-immigrant positions than individuals from higher classes. The widespread immigrant resentments among the traditional left-wing electorate bring left-wing parties in a dilemma: on the one hand, a growing segment of the population –including the traditional left-wing electorate– supports restrictive policies toward immigrants. On the other hand, left-wing parties have been the traditional defender of immigrants' rights and are thus expected in their own rank to pursue inclusive policies regarding immigrant rights (Freeman, 1986). Thus, in order to respond to their electorate demand, left-wing parties with holder offices might be tempted to implement more restrictive policies for immigrants' access to social protection (H3b).

Furthermore, we test several interaction effects. Firstly, we want to test the groundbreaking conclusion that Sainsbury (2012) drew from her qualitative comparison of social protection access of immigrants in France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. According to her, an inclusive welfare state regime does not necessarily lead to an inclusive access to social protection for immigrants (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 111). Rather, understanding immigrants' social rights requires considering both the welfare and integration regimes of a country (see also Sainsbury, 2006). Integration policies refer to group- or individual-based member-enabling policies aiming at accommodating, promoting and altering the life changes of immigrants (Goodman 2013: 12).

Integration regimes compose one out of three dimensions along which immigrant and immigration policies can be classified: integration regimes encompass regulations surrounding the settlement of immigrants, while immigration regimes deal with entry rules and citizenship regimes focus on regulations for political membership (i.e., naturalization policies) (Helbling, 2013). Sainsbury's (2012) comparison of Denmark and Sweden convincingly points to the fact that welfare state regime alone cannot explain why Denmark and Sweden differ so largely in the incorporation of immigrants in their welfare states. Indeed, these two Scandinavian countries belong to the same welfare state regime, but have implemented contrasting policies on immigrants' welfare state access. According to Sainsbury, Denmark, in contrast to Sweden, provides more restrictive access of immigrants to social protection. She argues that these differences can be related to the different integration regimes in Denmark and Sweden: the Danish integration regime is characterized by an explicit rejection of positive accommodation of immigrants (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013), while Sweden opted for inclusive immigrant rights policies. Sainsbury (2012) comes thus to the conclusion that understanding cross-national variation in immigrants' social protection access requires considering the combination of both welfare state and integration regimes. So far, this finding has been solely observed in qualitative studies comparing a small number of countries with contrasting characteristics, such as in Sainsbury's comparison of Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, the U.K. and the U.S. In this article, we are able to assess the generalizability of this result to a large sample of countries. If we translate Sainsbury's finding into quantitative terms, we would expect a significant interaction effect between welfare state generosity and the inclusiveness of integration policies on immigrants' access to social protection. More precisely and following Sainsbury (2012)'s conclusion, we expect immigrants' access to social protection to be the most inclusive in countries with a generous welfare state and with an inclusive integration regime. By contrast, social protection access for immigrants is expected to be the most restrictive in countries with limited welfare expenditures and with a restrictive integration regime. We therefore hypothesize a positive interaction effect between welfare state generosity and inclusiveness of integration policies on immigrants' access to general social protection (H4).

Since research on post-communist welfare states (e.g., Fenger, 2007; Hacker, 2009; Haggard & Kaufman, 2009) has shown that there are clear differences between traditional Western welfare states and post-communist welfare states due to the very different political and social trajectories at both sides of the Iron curtain, we additionally test whether the impact of left-wing governments and immigration flows on immigrants' social protection access differs between post-communist and Western countries.

4. Method and Data

As mentioned above, our dependent variable is composed of four indicators, i.e. the access of immigrants and their families to social security and housing (see above for details). We use the MIPEX indicators for the latest available year, which is 2014. Our country sample includes 27 rich democracies². Since we want to explain variation in the level of immigrants' access to social security

² Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, United Kingdom.

across countries, we run cross-sectional analyses. In addition and in order to assess the robustness of our findings, we run all models for the classical 21 OECD countries without the post-communist countries, because research has shown that social policies in post-communist have a different welfare state tradition than in Western European countries as mentioned above.

To test our first hypothesis, we include the overall welfare state generosity in our analysis. The overall welfare state generosity is measured by the average replacement rates across three different programs (unemployment, sickness and pension) (Scruggs, Jahn, & Kuitto, 2014). This indicator is only available for 21 OECD countries. When analyzing the broader country sample of 27 countries, we include a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a country belongs to the Scandinavian social democratic welfare regime type and 0 otherwise, assuming that Nordic welfare states are the most generous welfare states in our sample.

We computed the average rate of immigration flow (i.e., inflow of foreign population divided by the country's overall population) for the years 2003 to 2013 which enables the test of our second hypothesis. The statistics for immigration flows and for the overall population have been retrieved from the OECD database (International Migration Database, "Inflows of foreign population" and Population Statistics Database).³

Our third hypothesis refers to the relationship between left-wing governments and immigrants' access to general social policies. To measure the strength of left-wing parties we include the cabinet share of leftist parties in our analysis (see Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel, Weisstanner, & Engler, 2016).

To test our fourth hypothesis, we operationalize countries' integration policies by using the Multicultural Policy Index for immigrants (MCP) developed by Banting and Kymlicka (Multiculturalism Policy Index, 2016). The MCP index measures policies designed to recognize accommodate and support immigrants' cultural differences and goes beyond purely capturing anti-discrimination policies (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013, p. 583). This index is composed of eight indicators measuring recognition policies (such as the constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism), accommodation policies (e.g., exemptions from dress codes) and support policies (for instance, affirmative action policies for disadvantaged immigrant groups). Among the available comparative indexes measuring integration regimes, the MCP index encompasses the largest range of countries (N=21 Western democracies). The MCP index is nevertheless highly correlated with other available comparative indexes measuring integration regimes (Helbling, 2013). We used the immigrant MCP index scores for the year 2010. The index ranges from 0 (total rejection of positive recognition, accommodation and support of immigrants) to 8 (most inclusive recognition, accommodation and support policies for immigrants). Descriptive statistics for the main independent variables can be found in Table A2.

We will test the aforementioned hypotheses by controlling for a standard set of variables that are assumed to influence the overall welfare state generosity, such as GDP per capita (Wilensky, 1975), the level of public debt, union density, the dependency ratio measuring the share of elderly as percentage of the total working age population, the extent of globalization captured by the sum of export and import in percentage of the GDP, and a dummy variable capturing EU membership. All independent and control variables are computed as averages across the period ranging from 2003

³ The OECD statistics do not provide immigration flow statistics for the following countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Croatia.

until 2013.⁴ Furthermore, we test for federalism, as it has been shown to affect immigrants' access to social protection (with federal countries providing a more restrictive access to social protection for immigrants, Sainsbury, 2012). Including these variables do not change our main results. The detailed results can be found in the appendix (Tables A3 and A4).

5. Empirical Results

Table 2 presents our estimation results for the broader country sample including the post-communist countries. Model 1 is the baseline model and tests our first three hypotheses referring to the effect of welfare state generosity (H1), the level of immigration flows (H2) and left-wing governments (H3) on the immigrants' access to general social protection. Moreover, in Model 1 we controlled for GDP and included a dichotomous variable to control for post-communist countries. In Models 2, 3 and 4, we added interaction variables to analyze the extent to which the influence of our central independent variables differs between Western welfare states and post-communist countries.

Table 2: Access to general social policies (incl. post-communist countries)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP per capita	-0.00171** (0.000616)	-0.00168** (0.000613)	-0.00171*** (0.000553)	-0.000929 (0.000689)
Scandinavian welfare state	35.90** (12.90)	35.24** (13.11)	36.57*** (12.73)	31.67** (14.27)
Immigration flow	3,697* (1,911)	3,661* (1,932)	4,628** (1,856)	-3,115 (6,069)
Left government	-1.000*** (0.304)	-0.960*** (0.293)	-0.927*** (0.310)	-0.911** (0.345)
Post communist countries	-25.72 (21.32)	-20.34 (33.33)	0.923 (22.69)	
Left government * poco		-0.139 (0.528)		
Immigration flow * poco			-6,074* (3,015)	
Immigration flow squared				393,315 (295,851)
Observations	27	27	27	27
R-squared	0.390	0.391	0.483	0.382

Notes: poco = post-communist countries; standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁴ To secure the robustness of our results, we have also taken averages from 1993 until 2013. The results remain the same and are available upon request.

The results of Model 1 clearly support that Scandinavian countries, which traditionally have a generous welfare state, also include immigrants in general social security to a greater extent than all other welfare regime types. The coefficient for “Scandinavian welfare states” is positive and statistically significant at the 5 % level. The inclusion score measuring immigrants’ access to social protection is estimated to be more than 30 points higher than in alternative welfare regimes *ceteris paribus*. These results confirm our hypothesis H1a on a positive association between welfare state generosity and the level of inclusion of immigrants in social protection, but contradict our hypothesis on welfare chauvinism (H1b), according to which especially generous welfare states limit the access to social protection for immigrants to protect resources for insiders. In contrast, we find that welfare states with generous social regimes are more able and willing to include immigrants in general welfare state settings.

The estimations also reveal interesting results regarding the association between the size of immigration flows and the inclusion of immigrants in social protection. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that countries facing high levels of immigration flows provide immigrants with a more inclusive access to general social protection (which contradicts our second hypothesis). One reason might be that countries with high immigration flows have a stronger tradition and more experience in coping with problems resulting from immigration. The problem pressure arising from high immigration flows seems to push governments to find policy solutions which might, in consequence, lead to more inclusive access for immigrants to social protection.

The results for our variable capturing the strength of left-wing parties in government lead us to reject H3a and confirm H3b. Consistent across all models, the share of left-wing parties in government in the last decade seems to negatively influence the inclusion of immigrants in general social protection. The coefficient in Model 1 is statistically significant at the 1% level and substantive in size. What we could not observe with respect to the overall welfare state generosity in terms of welfare chauvinism, seems to hold when it comes to the governmental influence of left-wing parties: even though left-wing governments are traditionally in favor of more social spending and extending welfare state generosity, they tend to opt for strategies that save scarce resources for their core constituency. Left-wing governments seem to protect welfare states from outsiders restricting immigrants’ right to claim general social protection benefits. The score of immigrants’ inclusion in social security is estimated to be around 10 percent lower in countries where the representation of left-wing parties in government has been 10 percentage points higher over the last ten years.⁵

In a last step, we test in models 2 and 3 with the use of interactions the extent to which the association of left-wing government and the level of immigration flow with the level of immigrants’ inclusion in social security differ in post-communist countries. First, the interaction between post-communist countries and the share of left-wing parties in government in Model 2 is not significant. This means that the significantly negative relationship between left-wing governments and the level of immigrants’ inclusion in social protection is similar for both post-communist countries and Western countries. In Model 3, we included an interaction term between post-communist countries and immigration flows, which turns out to be significantly negative. Accordingly, high immigration flows are significantly associated with a more inclusive access to social protection for immigrants

⁵ This result does not imply that right-wing governments favor policies towards more integration of immigrants into general social protection since the group of parties which is not coded as left-wing includes very different party families such as the greens, conservatives, Christian and center parties as well as right-populist parties.

solely in Western welfare states. In post-communist countries, the positive relationship between immigration flows and the level of immigrants’ inclusion in social security disappears: the estimated relationship between immigration flows and immigrants’ inclusion in social security for post-communist countries (by combining the main and interaction effects) is not significant.

Figure 2: Marginal effects of immigration flow in (non) post-communist countries on the level of immigrants’ inclusion in social security (see Model 3, Table 2)





Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effect of immigration flows on the immigrants’ access to social protection in post-communist countries and Western welfare states presented in Model 3. The figure indicates that the problem pressure arising from immigration flows is associated with higher level of inclusion of immigrants in social security in Western countries. By contrast, immigration flow is not significantly related to the level of immigrants’ access to social security in post-communist countries.

The fact that immigration flows are typically low in post-communist countries, which have been relatively isolated during the era of the Cold War, might explain these results: post-communist countries do not have a long tradition in coping with high levels of immigration as many Western welfare states. In order to test this potential explanation, we included in Model 4 a squared term for immigration flows: if the significantly negative interaction between post-communist countries and immigration flows is due to the fact that post-communist countries face particular low immigration flows, we would expect a curvilinear relationship between immigration flows and the level of immigrants’ inclusion in social security (which is operationalized with the squared term of immigration flow in Model 4) . However, the results of Model 4 show that immigration flow has a linear –rather than a curvilinear- relationship with the level of inclusion of immigrants in social protection, as the squared term for immigration flow remains insignificant. Thus, the fact that the significantly positive relationship between immigration flows and the level of immigrants’ inclusion in social protection does not hold in post-communist countries, does not seem to be due to the large differences in the level of immigration flows in Western countries and post-communist countries.

Table 3 presents the results of our estimations that are limited to 21 OECD-countries. In Model 1 we, again, test our baseline model. In contrast to Table 2, Model 1 of Table 3 is composed of a more differentiated measurement of welfare state generosity that is only available for a smaller country sample (see section 4 for more details). In Model 2, we additionally include the Multicultural Policy Index as main effect and test in Model 3 whether the overall welfare state generosity is associated with a more inclusive access of immigrants to social protection in countries characterized by inclusive integration policies (by including an interaction term between welfare state generosity and the Multicultural Policy Index).

Before turning to the results of the regression analyses in Table 3, the following Figure 3 presents a first empirical approximation by showing the bivariate relationship of the index capturing multicultural policies with our dependent variable, namely the level of immigrants' access to social protection. The different types of welfare states are marked in different colors. Interestingly, we cannot observe a specific bivariate pattern that would indicate a strong relationship between these variables. In Table 3, we check whether the bivariate relationships presented in Figure 3 are also observable in a multivariate setting.

Figure 3: Immigrants' access to social protection and multicultural policies



Before turning to the association of the Multicultural Policy Index with our dependent variable, Model 1 of Table 3 enables us to test the robustness of the relationships of welfare state generosity, immigration flow and left-wing government with the level of immigrants' access to social protection, observed in Table 3, by restricting the analysis to a smaller sample of 21 countries (excluding the post-communist countries). First, we find a positive association of the overall welfare state generosity on the access of immigrants to the welfare state in line with the results of Table 2. However, the coefficient only reaches statistical significance in Model 1. In the smaller sample of 21 countries the welfare state generosity is not as closely related to the social protection policies as in the larger country sample, which includes the post-communist countries. Second, the influence of left-wing governments remains the same in size and statistical significance as in the large country sample of Table 3. Left-wing governments in Western welfare states as well as in post-communist

countries seem to restrict access of immigrants to social security and social housing to protect scarce resources for their core clientele among the working class, who might feel threatened by outsiders' claims for social benefits.

Lastly, the results for immigration flows are also in line with the results of Table 2. Countries challenged by high levels of immigration flows tend to provide a more inclusive access for social protection to immigrants.

In the second model of Table 3, we included the Multicultural Policy Index. Surprisingly, we do not observe a statistical significant substantive association of multicultural policies with the level of immigrants' inclusion in general social protection. Countries scoring high in terms of inclusive multicultural policies do not necessarily grant equal access for immigrants to mainstream social policies. This result supports the bivariate pattern observable in Figure 3: there is no significant relationship between the Multicultural Policy Index and the level of immigrants' inclusion into social protection. For the sake of comprehensiveness, we included in Model 3 an interaction term between the multicultural policy index and the variable measuring overall welfare generosity. The main and interaction effects remain insignificant, which leads us to reject our last hypothesis (H4). Furthermore, this indicates that the findings provided by Sainsbury (2012) for a limited number of countries cannot be generalized to a larger country sample.

Table 3: Immigrants' access to social protection - 21 OECD countries

VARIABLES	(1) 1	(2) 2	(3) 3
GDP per capita	-0.00132** (0.000476)	-0.00132** (0.000492)	-0.00132** (0.000519)
Welfare state generosity	1.481* (0.815)	1.505 (0.894)	1.410 (2.196)
Left government	-0.947*** (0.304)	-0.955** (0.340)	-0.953** (0.351)
Immigration flow	3,541* (1,825)	3,535* (1,876)	3,555 (2,094)
Multicultural policies		0.213 (2.134)	-0.405 (11.67)
Multicultural policies * welfare state generosity			0.0200 (0.405)
Observations	21	21	21
R-squared parentheses	0.422	0.423	0.423

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6. Conclusion

This article provided the first quantitative study investigating cross-national differences in the inclusion of immigrants to general social protection. Based on comparative indicators measuring the access for different immigrant statuses to social housing and social protection from the MIPEX dataset, we could analyze the level of immigrants' inclusion to social protection across 27 rich democracies. In contrast to previous studies based on a qualitative approach focusing on few countries, we assessed the extent to which a large number of industrialized democracies differ in the level of access to social security they grant to immigrants. Our results show very large variation in the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security and social housing across countries. Moreover, this variation does not seem to follow a pattern that could be interpreted in terms of welfare state or integration regimes. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis enables us to evaluate the generalizability of findings highlighted in previous qualitative casestudies to a large number of rich democracies. First, our results confirm Banting (2000)'s argument that generous welfare states tend to provide immigrants with a more inclusive access to their general social protection schemes. This finding contradicts the view that immigrants are excluded in generous welfare states as one form of welfare chauvinism to protect resources from outsiders. Secondly, general social protection is especially inclusive for immigrants in countries facing high levels of immigration flow. The inclusion of immigrants in social protection seems to be one strategy to cope with high levels of immigration. Interestingly, this relationship between immigration flows and the level of immigrants' inclusion in social protection does not hold in post-communist countries. Moreover, this result cannot be explained by the fact that post-communist countries face particularly low immigration flows but might be due to the very different political and social trajectories of welfare states at both sides of the Iron Curtain (e.g., Fenger, 2007; Hacker, 2009; Haggard & Kaufman, 2009). Thirdly, our findings highlight the fact that left-wing cabinets are particular reluctant to open general social protection schemes to immigrants as one type of outsiders: left-wing governmental actors tend to seek protecting their core constituency based in the working class by limiting inclusive social protection for immigrants. Lastly, our study shows that Sainsbury (2012)'s conclusion regarding the important role played by integration regimes in explaining cross-national differences in the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security cannot be generalized to a large set of countries. Indeed and according to our analysis based on Banting & Kymlicka (2013)'s Multicultural Policy Index for immigrants, multicultural policies are neither directly associated with the level of immigrants' access to social protection nor do they condition the relationship between the overall welfare state generosity and the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security. Our results point to the fact that generous welfare states do not have significantly more inclusive social protection schemes for immigrants when their policy constellation is characterized by inclusive multicultural policies. Our results confirm Bloemraad (2017)'s observation on the difficulties to empirically clarify the mechanisms through which multicultural policies might affect welfare policies.

This study suffers of course from several limitations. First, the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security was measured by four indicators on immigrants' access to social security and housing that has been collected among national experts within the MIPEX project (Huddleston et al., 2015). These indicators should be considered as rough estimates of the level of immigrants' inclusion in social security and housing: such quantitative indicators are not intended to provide a nuanced measure of the complexity of such social policy fields. Furthermore, the indicators we used in this study provide

a measure of the legislative regulation surrounding the access of different immigrant statuses to social security and social housing. The analysis of such indicators does not say anything about the effective implementation of regulations. Further research needs to assess the outcome of such policies and the extent to which immigrants holding different types of legal statuses effectively access social security and housing. In addition and as mentioned earlier, our dependent variable measured immigrants' access to social security and housing without taking into account the overall level of generosity for social security and housing. Our analysis shows that the inclusiveness of immigrants into social protection is higher in countries providing a more generous welfare level. Nevertheless, these two dimensions (level of immigrants' access and level of overall generosity) are conceptually independent from each other: a country might grant equal access for immigrants to social protection but provides a meager level of overall social protection. Further studies are required to enhance our understanding on the complex relationship between these two dimensions across countries. However, even though data on the legal access of immigrants' to social security do not capture aspects such as the effective coverage or benefit generosity, they allow us to shed light on the factors that shape central governments taking over responsibility in these affairs. In addition, this study focuses on access to social security and housing for immigrants who legally entered the destination countries. Our analysis cannot capture the exclusion mechanisms used by the destination countries through residency requirements. Thus, a large share of immigrants might remain excluded from social security and social housing even in a country that grants an equal access for immigrants to these policies, if this country applies highly restrictive requirements for legal residence permits to third-country nationals. Lastly, previous case studies highlighted the important role of legal institutions and legal constraints in some Western countries in shaping the extent of immigrants' inclusion in mainstream social policies (e.g., Guiraudon, 2002; Sainsbury, 2012). Unfortunately, we were not able to empirically assess the role of legal constraints on immigrants' access to general social security due to the lack of available comparative measurements of legal constraints for such a large country sample. Our analysis thus missed to consider an important type of actors in the allocation of immigrants' social rights. Keeping these limitations in mind, this study should therefore be understood as a first step toward a new research avenue that aims at assessing the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream policies with a comparative perspective.

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Appendix:

Table A1: Integration of immigrants into general social policies – Descriptives

Country	Social Security	Housing	Overall
Estonia	100	100	100
Germany	100	100	100
Sweden	100	100	100
Canada	100	100	100
Romania	100	100	100
France	100	100	100
New Zealand	100	100	100
Poland	100	100	100
Slovakia	100	75	87.5
Switzerland	100	75	87.5
Italy	100	75	87.5
Denmark	75	100	87.5
Belgium	50	100	75
Spain	100	50	75
Austria	75	75	75
Finland	75	75	75
Japan	75	75	75
Bulgaria	50	50	50
Netherlands	50	50	50
Ireland	50	50	50
Portugal	50	50	50
USA	25	75	50
Greece	75	25	50
Czech Republic	25	25	25
Hungary	50	0	25
Australia	25	25	25
Norway	25	25	25
Slovenia	25	25	25
United Kingdom	0	0	0

Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the main independent variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
GDP per capita	27	33334.8	14792.8	9464.5	66960.6
Welfare state Generosity	21	32.1	6.4	21.0	42.9
Immigration flow	27	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Left government	27	32.4	22.0	0.0	76.0
Multicultural policies	21	3.6	2.4	0	8
Scandinavian welfare state	27	0.1	0.4	0.0	1.0
Post-communist countries	27	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0

Table A3: Robustness checks – Large country sample

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
GDP per capita	-0.00171** (0.000620)	-0.00171** (0.000674)	-0.00183*** (0.000637)	-0.00163** (0.000635)	-0.00172** (0.000625)
Scandinavian welfare state	35.90** (13.37)	35.80** (13.90)	57.02* (31.34)	34.89** (12.68)	33.96** (16.21)
Immigration flow	-1.001*** (0.322)	-1.002*** (0.316)	-1.032*** (0.306)	-1.004*** (0.309)	-1.004*** (0.312)
Left government	3,700* (2,055)	3,705* (1,969)	4,137** (1,892)	3,837* (2,050)	3,498 (2,157)
Post-communist countries	-25.63 (25.11)	-25.36 (22.98)	-28.92 (22.36)	-21.46 (21.83)	-28.70 (22.49)
Trade openness	-0.00108 (0.149)				
EU-Membership		0.585 (11.47)			
Union density			-0.443 (0.587)		
Elderly				1.188 (2.204)	
Debt					-0.0505 (0.127)
Observations	27	27	27	27	27
R-squared	0.390	0.390	0.405	0.398	0.392

Notes: poco = post-communist countries; standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Robustness checks – Small country sample

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP per capita	-0.00153** (0.000541)	-0.00168* (0.000810)	-0.00102* (0.000561)	-0.00156*** (0.000464)	-0.00158** (0.000561)	-0.00129** (0.000513)
Welfare state generosity	3.105*** (0.929)	2.290* (1.309)	0.970 (0.967)	1.133 (0.999)	1.678* (0.923)	1.535 (0.944)
Immigration flow	5,320*** (1,673)	3,253* (1,740)	4,248** (1,730)	4,015* (1,985)	3,227* (1,775)	3,084 (2,358)
Left government	-1.230*** (0.225)	-0.937*** (0.260)	-0.951*** (0.283)	-0.992*** (0.304)	-1.073*** (0.341)	-0.915*** (0.307)
Trade openness	-0.408** (0.169)					
EU-Membership		-15.08 (19.79)				
Union density			3.289 (2.255)			
Elderly				0.385 (0.314)		
Debt					-0.174 (0.169)	
Federalism						4.377 (7.355)
Observations	21	21	21	21	21	21
R-squared	0.538	0.448	0.490	0.474	0.452	0.439


Notes: standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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